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Recent Cases.
ADMINISTRATION-SUIT FOR EXPENSE OF ADMINISTRATION-JURISDICrION OF
CIRCUIT COURT
Barnes v. Boatmen's National Bank of St. Louis,
Appellee, a psychiatric expert, recovered a judgment for $15,000 in the circuit
court for services rendered in certain litigation before discovery of a will It was
directed by the circuit court that this judgment be certified to the probate court
and there classified and paid as a cost of administering the testator's estate. The
probate courf then sustained a motion made by the executor to strike the judgment
from the probate files on the ground that the circuit court had no jurisdiction to
render it. This was reversed by the circuit court and on appeal to the supreme
court the sole contention of the executor was that under Article VI, Section 34,
Constitution of 1875,2 creating and defining the jurisdiction of probate courts, the
circuit court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter. It was held that while
the Constitution of 1875 and statutes enacted under it gave the probate court
jurisdiction, it was not made exclusive. The suit against the executor then could
be brought directly in the circuit court, without its first being presented in the
probate court.
The court's reasoning was as follows. It was admitted that the Constitution
of 1875 did not expressly make the probate court's jurisdiction over claims against the
executor exclusive. The question then was whether or not any statute had, and it
was held that none had done so. Section 2100 (2), Mo. Rev. Stats., (1939), s in
giving exclusive original jurisdiction to the circuit courts of some subject matter,
by necessary converse implication indicates that such courts may have concurrent
original jurisdiction of some causes with the probate courts. Section 655 (21), Mo.
Rev. Stats. (1939)4 enacted after acceptance of ,the Constitution of 1875, took
jurisdiction away from the county courts, giving it to the probate courts, but no
statute has taken any power from the circuit courts, so that whatever powers they
had prior to the creation of the probate courts were retained. Statutes that authorize
establishing in the circuit court those claims provable as demands in the probate
1. 199 S. W. 2d 917 (Mo. 1947).
2. The court did not decide or even consider whether the result would be the
same under the Constitution of 1945, but there seems to be no material difference
in their provisions on this point. See Article 6, § § 22 and 34, Constitution of 1875,
and Article 5, § § 14, 16 and 17, Constitution of 1945.
3. "The circuit courts in the respective counties in which they may be held
shall have power and jurisdiction as follows: ...Second-Exclusive original juris-
diction in all civil cases which shall not be cognizable before the county courts,
probate courts and justices of the peace, and not otherwise provided for by law."
4. "Whenever any duty proscribed by the provisions of any law of this state
in relation to probate matters is required to be performed by the county court, the
same shall be taken and construed to be required to be performed by the probate
court."
1
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court (present sections 183, 184, 188 and 208) do not limit those claims provable
in circuit courts to the debts incurred by the decedent, but debts incurred by the
executor after death of the decedent may also be presented. There is no line of
demarcation between the "debts," "judgments," and classified "demands" mentioned
in the foregoing sections, and the "charges" and "expenses of administration" men-
tioned in Sections 220 and 224. Either may be presented originally in the circuit
court.
The specific point raised in this case is new to the supreme court of this state.
The decision, however, seems amply supported by the statutes and by reason. The
state, having jurisdiction over the subject matter, may grant that jurisdiction to
whichever court it chooses. The question is, to which court has the power been
given? By statute, clearly the suit could have been brought in the probate court.,
It is likewise clear that from the probate order appeal could be perfected to the
circuit court where the case would be heard, tried and determined "anew, without
regarding any error, defect, or other imperfection in the proceeding of the probate
court" 8 When the appeal was perfected the probate court's order would be vacated
and the court would have no more authority in the premises. Now, under this deci-
sion, suit against the administrator may be brought in the circuit court directly,
omitting the trial in probate court with subsequent appeal.
The result then is that a suit for expenses of administration may be brought
in either court, dependent only upon the desire of the party bringing the action.
Under our present probate system, since the probate court's order could b6 vacated
and the cause tried anew in the circuit court, there seems no valid reason for deny-
ing the right to bring the suit there directly, so long as the statutes do not expressly
declare that the probate court has-exclusive original jurisdiction. However, it is
supposed that in most instances it will be desirable to bring the action in probate
court because of its speedier action, the lesser costs, and the relatively lesser amount
of litigation usually pending.
The present case further points up the question of justification for a probate
system that provides for a trial de nwvo on appeal from the probate court. The
notion that an appeal from the probate court should result in a new trial has been
discarded in several states as an inefficient and cumbersome method.7 The Model
Probate Code8 provides for only a review of the trial, not a trial de novo, and
numerous writers have also attacked the present system. A jury trial may be had
in the -probate court as well as in the circuit court.0 The qualifications of the
probate judge under the Constitution of 1875 were so low that there was a feeling
that the appeal should result in a new trial. 'Under the Constitution of 1945, how-
5. Mo. REv. STAT. § 189 (1939).
'6. Mo. REv. STAT. § 283, 291 (1939).
7. ALA. CODE, tit. 7, § § 776, 775, 783, 784 (1940). FLA. STAT., § § 61.01-61.07(1941). See Simes and Basye, Organization of the Probate Court in America, 42
MicH. L. REv. 965 (1944), 43 MIcH. L. REv. 113 (1 944).
8. MODEL PROBATE CODE § 20 (g). See comment
9. Mo. REv. STAT. § 200 (1939).
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ever, most probate judges have legal training, and in .the near future they will all
be lawyers, so that objection to a review rather than a new trial is nearly gone. If
the probate court is to function properly, no practical purpose can be served by
permitting a litigant to by-pass it at his whim.
J. KEITH GIBSON
CONTRACrs-PRoTEcTION OF AN IDEA
Schonwald v. F. Burkhart Mfg. Co.'
Plaintiff worked out a process for making laminated canvas shoe soles. He
agreed to tell the defendant about it if the defendant would manufacture it exclu-
sively for him. This the defendant agreed to do. As the agreement was finally
worked out, the plaintiff was to receive a 10% commission' on all such soles ordered
through him, and he was to have the exclusive right to sell the soles. The agreement
was never reduced to writing, though the plaintiff asked that it be. The plaintiff
worked with the defendant's production manager for a period of six weeks to adapt
the idea to manufacture. The idea was not new to the defendant, who had un-
successfully tried to make a cloth sole for another company, using a lighter cloth
and a different type glue. After securing large orders for the soles, the plaintiff
was informed that his commission would be cut to 5%. He also heard that another
leather salesman was selling the soles. About two months later, he was told that
the two largest accounts he had secured were to be made house accounts, and that
he would no longer receive a commission on them. The plaintiff was never authorized
to make any more sales for the defendant, and was never again able to see the de-
fendant's president. He broughft an action for breach of contract and obtained a
verdict for $109,664.68. This was affirmed on appeal.
There is no property right in a mere abstract idea.2 But if an idea is novel,
original, lawful, and in concrete form, it becomes literary property and may be
protected as such. 3 In the instant case, the plaintiff's idea was neither novel nor
original. Therefore it could not be protecied as literary property.
Can an idea which is neither novel nor original, and therefore not property, be
protected by contract? Disclosure of an idea which is not new, original, or valuable
1. 202 S. W. 2d 7 (Mo. 1947). For an excellent discussion of the general
subject, see Logan, The Legal Protection of Ideas, 4 Mo. L. REv. 239 (1938).
2. Bowen v. Yankee Network, 46 F. Supp. 62 (D. Mass. 1942); Stone v.
Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., 260 App. Div. 450, 23 N. Y. S. 2d 210 (1st Dep't
1940); 18 C. J. S., p. 143, Sec. 10e.
3. Thompson v. Famous Players-Lasky Corp., 3 F. 2d 707 (N. D. Ga.
1925); Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Meyer, 101 Ind. App. 420, 194 N. E. 206
(1935); Healey v. R. H. Macy & Co., 251 App. Div. 440, 297 N. Y. S. 165 (1st
Dep't 1935), aff'd 277 N. Y. 681, 14 N. E. 2d 388 (1938); Logan, supra n. 1, at
p. 259. With the statements in the above cases, compare Fendler v. Morosco, 253
N. Y. 281, 171 N. E. 56, 58 (1930), in which it was said "There may be literary
property in a particular combination of ideas or in the form in which ideas are
embodied. There can be none in the ideas." An allegation of novelty and concrete-
ness is not enough; the idea must actually be novel and concrete. Plus Promotions,
Inc., v. R. C. A. Mfg. Co., 49 F. Supp. 116 (S. D. N. Y. 1943).
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has been held insufficient consideration for a "contract.4 These decisions, however,
have been subject to criticism.r Dicta in other cases" and a few holdings? indicate
that an idea which is not property may be protected by contract.
The first Missouri case on the subject is Brunner v. Stix, Baer, and Fdlcr5 ,
There it was said that disclosure of a new and useful idea, or one thought to be
useful, was sufficient consideration for the promise to pay for such disclosure. The
court also stated specifically that the decision rested on a contract basis and not
on a property basis.
The instant case follows the decision in the Brunner case. The court points out
that the idea is in concrete form, was useful to the defendant, and from the stand-
point of use, was new to the defendant. The decision is made easier by the service
rendered by the plaintiff, the court saying, "Certainly, when we have the additional
factor. .. of the use of the plaintiff's services (which covered a period of six weeks)
in instructing defendant how to put this plan in operation . . . we have proper
subject matter for protection by contract."O In the light of the Brunner case, this
hardly seems necessary to the decision. If necessary, one might question whether
'it is a valid ground on which to put the decision, the services being of such short
duration and the defendant's experience such that production problems probably
could have been solved without the plaintiff's aid.
JosEPH J. RUSSELL
4. Masline v. New York, N. H. & H. R. CQ., 95 Conn. 702, 112 At. 639(1921); Singer v. Karron, 162 Misc. 809, 294 N. Y. Supp. 566 (Mun. Ct. 1937);
Shapiro v. Press Publishing Co., 235 App. Div. 698, 255 N. Y. Supp. 899 (2d Dep't
1938); Soule v. Bon Ami Co., 201 App. Div. 794, 195 N. Y. Supp. 574 (2nd Dep't
1922), aff'd 235 N. Y. 609, 139 N. E. 754 (1923).
5. The Masline case is criticized in 19 MICH. L. REv. 874 (1921). The Soule
case is criticized in 8 CORN. L. Q, 246 (1923).
6. Lueddecke v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 70 F. 2d 345 (C.C.A. 8th 1934);
Haskins v. Ryan, 71 N. J. Eq. 575, 6J Atl. 436 (Ch. 1906) aff'd 75 N. J. Eq. 623, 73
Ad. 1118 (Ct. Err. & App. 1909); Keller v. American Chain Co., 255 N. Y. 94, 174
N. E. 74 (1930); Bristol v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 132 N. Y. 264, 30 N. E.
506 (1892) (affirming the decision rendered in 52 Hun. 161, 5 N. Y. Supp. 131"
(Sup. Ct. 1889)).
7. Elfenbein v. Luckenbach Terminals, Inc., 111 N. J. L. 67, 166 Alt. 91
(1933); Alberts v. Remington-Rand, Inc., 175 Misc. 486, 23 N. Y. S. 2d 892
(Sup. Ct. 1940) (action on implied contract denied because idea not concrete, but
action on express contract upheld); High v. ,Trade Union Courier Publishing Corp.,
69 N. Y. S. 2d 526 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
8. 352 Mo. 1225, 181 S. W. 2d 643 (1944). This case was relied on by both
parties in the principal case, and was strongly relied on by the court in its decision.
The plaintiff devise4 an employee's sales campaign and contest in order to secure
new customers and charge accounts. The defendant agreed to use the plan and pay
the amount found to be the reasonable value after the plan was tried. Despite
its success, the defendant refused to pay for it, claiming there was no consideration
for the promise to pay.
9. Schonwald v. F. Burkhart Mfg. Co., supra, p. 13.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT TO COUNSEL UNDER DUE PROCESS OF LAW CLAUSE
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Foster v. Illinois'
Petitioners were convicted in 1935 of burglary and larceny upon a plea of guilty.
The record states that petitioners were advised of their rights of trial and the
consequences of a plea of guilty but persisted in their respective pleas, which were
then received. In 1946, petitioners proceeded by writ of error in the Supreme Court
of Illinois to test the validity of sentences imposed, contending that the record
failed to show cdmpliance with the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment in that petitioners were not offered assistance of counsel. The Supreme
Court of Illinois denied the writ.
On certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, the judgment was
affirmed. The failure of the record to show an offer of counsel, standing by itself,
with no other circumstances to indicate "that for want of benefit of counsel an in-
gredient of unfairness actively operated in the process that resulted in his confine-
ment,"2 does not violate "'rights essential to a fair hearing"3 under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Sixth Amendment provides that, in federal courts, a defendant in a crim-
inal prosecution has a right to the assistance of counsel. 4 However, the Supreme
Court in Powell v. Alabama5 first recognized that the right of assistance of counsel
also falls within the requirements of due process of law as guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment and is thus applicable to prosecutions in state courts.6 In that
case the defendants were charged with rape, said to have occurred on March 25,
1931. The indictment was returned on March 31 and trial resulting in conviction
occurred on April 6. The defendants were non-residents, had no friends or relatives
within Alabama, were given no opportunity to obtain counsel, and no attorney was
definitely designated to appear on their behalf until the day of the trial. In addi-
tion, defendants were young, illiterate, and surrounded by hostile sentiment. The
Supreme Court, by Justice Sutherland, stated "that in a capital case, where the
defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his
own defense because of ignorance, feeble-mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the
duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary
1. 67 Sup. Ct 1716 (1947).
2. Id. at 1718.
3. Id. at 1719.
4. "The Sixth Amendment withholds from federal courts, in all criminal
proceedings, the power and authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty
unless he has or waives the assistance of counsel." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S.
458 at 463 (1938).
5. 287 U. S. 45 (1932).
6. In Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 79 at 99 (1908), it is said that the
personal rights enumerated by the first eight amendments may or may not fall
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but if they do, it is
not because of their' enumeration, but because they are, by their nature, included
in the concept of due process of law.
1948] ,RECENT CASES
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requisite of due process of law; and that duty is not discharged by an assignment at
such a time or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid
in the-preparation and trial of the case."7 In Palko v. Connecticut,8 Justice Cardozo
stated that the decision in the Powell case "turned upon.the fact that in the par-
ticular situation laid before us in the evidence the benefit of counsel was essential
to the substance of ahearing."9 On the other hand, in Grosjean v. American Press
Co.,10 the court said "... . in Powell v. Alabama... we concluded that certain funda-
mental rights, safeguarded by the first eight amendments against federal action,
were also safeguarded against state action by the due process of law clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and among them the fundamental right of the accused to
the aid of counsel in a criminal prosecution.""
Ten years after the Powell case, in Smith v. O'Grady,'2 it was held that a con-
viction by which the due process clause was violated through a denial of counsel,
could be collaterally attacked by means of a writ of habeas corpus.18
Then in 1942 what had come to be called the rule of Powell v. Alabama was
considerably 8haken. In Betts v. Brady,14 the petitioner pleaded not guilty to a
charge of robbery after his request for the assistance of counsel was denied, it being
the practice to furnish counsel for indigent defendants only in prosecutions for murder
and rape. He was convicted after a futile attempt at representing himself. Petitioner
had been convicted of larceny some years before, was a person of ordinary intelli-
gence but of very little education. Justice Roberts, speaking for the court, denied
petitioner's writ of habeas corpus and refused to impose a rigid requirement that a
state furnish counsel in every case. A review of the history of the problem indicated
to him that it was a matter, of legislative policy and not a fundamental right and
that great- difficulty would arise in distinguishing crimes of different magnitude
were that to be taken into consideration.'5 Language such as that by Justice Car-
dozo in Paiko v. Connecticut, quoted above, was freely referred to and the court
concluded by saying that "while want of counsel in a particular case may result in
a conviction lacking in such fundamental fairness, we cannot say that the Amend-
ment embodies an inexorable command that no trial for any offense, or in any court,
can be fairly conducted and justice accorded a defendant who is not represented by
counsel."16 A vigorous dissent by Justice Black contended that the right to counsel
7. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 at 71 (1932).
8. 302 U. S. 319 (1937).
9. Id. at 327.
10. 297 U. S. 233 (1936).
11. Id. at 243.
12. 312 U. S. 329 (1941).
13. Williams v..Kaiser, 323 U. S.. 471 (1945) is an interesting case in this
connection.
14. 316 U. S. 455 (1942).
15.. Mr. Edward S. Corwin in his work, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT
MEANS TODAY, at p. 189, n. 12, says "The result (iti Betts v. Brady) may have been
influenced in some measure by the known high character of the trial judge, who acted,
as the state law permitted in ie circumstances, without a jury."
16. Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 at 473 (1942).
[Vol. 13
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is fundamental and could be extended to include serious non-capital offenses with-
out difficulty.
In 1945, the fact that the crime charged was a capital offense played an im-
portant role in the companion case of Williams v. Kaiser'7 and Tomkins v. Mis-
souri.s. In the former, the petitioner, who was charged with armed robbery (a cap-
ital offense in Missouri), requested counsel but none was appointed. He then plead-
ed guilty, being incapable of making his own defense adequately. The Supreme
Court held that such facts showed a denial of a "fundamental" constitutional right,
with emphasis on the fact that the crime charged was a capital offense. Moreover,
the court stated in a note appended to the decision that it was not alleged by the
petitioner that he "was denied a fair trial, that he was ignorant, that he was inno-
cent, or that the court was prejudiced. But it is not apparent how the addition of
any such allegations to the petition would be relevant to petitioner's cause of action
based on the constitutional right to counsel."'1 In Tomkins v. Missouri, the peti-,
tioner was accused of murder in the first degree, did not request counsel due to
ignorance of his right to do so, did not have the assistance of counsel, pleaded guilty
and was sentenced to life imprisonment. The court held no request was necessary,
saying counsel "must be assigned to the accused if he is unable to employ one and
is incapable adequately of making his own defense." 20 Emphasis was again laid
on the crime charged having been a capital offense.
21
These two cases seemingly showed a disposition on the part of the court to
regard this right of counsel as a fundamental and thu' absolute right, rather than
as an ingredient of a fair trial, at least where capital offenses are involved.22 More-
over, in Rice v. Olson,23 decided the same term, the right to counsel was said to be
a fundamental right in a case involving a non-capital offense, although the need for
counsel due to a complex jurisdictional question was emphasized.
In 1946, the case of Canizio v. New York24 presented the picture of a nine-
teen-year-old boy, indigent, poorly educated, orphaned, and ignorant of his right
to counsel, who was indicted on May 25, 1931 for three offenses, robbery in the
first degree, grand larceny in the second degree, and assault in the second degree.
17. 323 U. S. 471 (1945).
18. 323 U. S. 485 (1945).
19. Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U. S. 471 at 479 (1945).'
20. Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 U. S. 485 at 487 (1945).
21. "The nature of the charge emphasizes the need for counsel.. . .And the
ingredients of the crime of murder in the first degree as distinguished from the lesser
offenses (of murder in the second degree and manslaughter) are not simple but ones
over which skilled judges and practitioners have disagreements. The guiding hand
of counsel is needed lest the unwary concede that which only bewilderment or
ignorance could justify. . . ." Id. at 488.
22. "It has never been suggested until now that Madison would have done
better to compress the Fourth and Sixth Amendments, as well as a large part of the
Fifth, into the brief requirement of a 'fair trial.'" Green, Liberty Under the Four-
teenth Amendment, 27 WAsH. U. L. Q. 497 (1942).
23. 324 U. S. 786 (1945).
24. 327 U. S. 82 (1946).
RECENT CASES1948]
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Arraignment and a plea of not guilty followed the same day. On June 1, the plea
of not guilty was withdrawn and a plea of guilty to first degree robbery entered,
after which the prosecutor withdrew the other charges. On June 17, a notice of
appearance of counsel was filed and on June 19, with counsel present, petitioner
was sentenced. It was held that this constituted sufficient representation by counsel
since counsel could have moved to withdraw the plea of guilty, which motion could
have been granted, on the day of sentence. Justice Murphy dissented, saying the
right to counsel would be meaningless unless counsel was available at every step
of the proceeding.25 Moreover, he said, the plea of guilty, had it been withdrawn,
might have been used in evidence against the petitioner under New York law. A
dissent by Justice Rutledge rested solely on the latter point.
In 1947 the court has indicated that the fair trial rule will be adhered to in
determining whether a constitutional right is infringed by conviction of a crime in
a state court without the assistance of counsel. This is so with regard to both
capital and non-capital offenses.28 Thus, no broad generality can be said to state
the law. The result in a particular case appears to depend upon a number of cir-
cumstances, one or more of which must appear in order for the court to hold that
the due process clause was violated by failure to furnish the defendant with counsel.
These circumstances are: (1) the nature of the offense, (2) the age of the defendant,
(3) the ability of the defendant to represent himself insofar as intelligence and
education play a part, (4) the legal technicalities in defining the crime charged,
(5) the ability of the defendant to procure counsel himself, (6) the opportunity
given defendant to procure his own counsel.
A brief dissent was entered by Justice Black in the principal case saying this was
a regrettable continuation of the view taken in Betts v. Brady. Justice Rutledge,
in the other dissenting opinion, stated that the failure of the record to show an offer
of' counsel, plus the fact that Illinois law, in other than capital offenses, did not
require such an offer, must lead to the conclusion that petitioner was deliberately
denied such assistance and that without that assistance, a fair trial was impossible
due to petitioner's poverty and ignorance and the complexities of the offenses
charged. Justice Rutledge also made reference to the companion case of Gayes v.
New York, 27 in which he also entered his dissent. The facts there showed that
petitioner, on July 15, 1938, at the age of sixteen, was arraigned on an indictment
for third degree burglary and petty larceny. He was asked if he desired counsel and
said he did not, following which he pleaded guilty. After his release, petitioner, then
nineteen years old, on October 14, 1941, pleaded guilty to a new charge of burglary
in the third degree at which time he again was not assisted by counsel. His sentence
was that of a second offender and he then attacked the validity of the first con-
viction and, ihrough its alleged invalidity, the legality of his sentence as a second
25. Cf. Hawk v. Olson, 326 U. S. 271 (1945).
26. De Meerleer v. Michigan, 67 Sup. Ct 596 (1947) (capital offense); Foster
v. Illinois, 67 Sup. Ct. 1716 (1947) (non-capital offense-the principal case).
27. 67 Sup. Ct 1711 (1947).
[Vol. 13
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RECENT CASES
offender. This attack, under New York law, had to be by motion to' vacate the
judgment against him in the court in which he was convicted. His motion was
denied and on certiolari to the Supreme Court of the United States, the judgment
was affirmed. The court, by Justice Frankfurter, said the Canizio case controlled
the decision, since an opportunity had existed to meet the legal implications of the
plea before sentence was imposed, in that petitioner had full opportunity to contest
any infirmity in the earlier sentence when the fact of that sentence was included
in the second offender sentence. Justice Rutledge wrote a conviricing dissenting
opinion in which he decried such a doctrine of forfeitures and stated that the
Canizio case had no relevance to this case on the facts or the law. The court's de-
cision, he said, had the effect of inverting the state procedure, inasmuch as peti-
tioner had followed the appropriate method for attacking his second sentence. It
might also be pointed out that when petitioner, as the court said, accepted his
second sentence without raising the question of the validity of his previous convic-
tion, he did so without the benefit of counsel.
The decisions in the Gayes case and the principal case illustrate the diversity
of opinion possible in what is regarded as a fair trial. They serve to point up very
well Justice Black's protest in the principal case of the result produced by "this
Court's day-to-day opinion of what kind of trial is fair and decent. ...,,18 But if
violation of due process by denial of the benefits of counsel is to depend on whether,
overall, a fair trial was had, and it is argued (as it well can be) that a fair trial is
well-nigh impossible without the assistance of counsel, it would seem that the court
should be more demanding in its conception of fairness than it has appeared to be
in the Gayes, Canizio, and principal case. ROBERT L. HAWKINS, JR.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-VALIDITY OF STATE LAW PERMITTING COURT AND
PROSECUTION TO COMMENT UPON FAILURE OF AcCUSED IN CRIMINAL
CASE TO TESTIFY IN OWN BEHALF
Adamson v. People of California1
Admiral Dewey Adamson, a citizen of the United States, was convicted, with-
out recommendation for mercy, by a jury in a superior court of the State of Cali-
fornia of murder in the first degree.2 The sentence of death was affirmed by the
supreme court of the state3 An appeal' to the Supreme Court of the United States
was granted. 4 The defendant did not take the stand in his own defense. The court
28. Foster v. Illinois, 67 Sup. Ct. 1716 at 1719 (1947).
1. 67 Sup. Ct. 1672 (1947).
2. The facts leiiding to the finding of Adamson guilty have been omitted
from this note. The present note will only deal with the constitutional law ques-
tions involved as presented to the Supreme Court of the United States.
3. 27 Cal. 2d 478, 165 Pac. 2d 3 (1946).
4. Judicial Code § 237, 28 U. S. C. § 344 (1940). Authorizes appeal to the
Supreme Court from the final judgment of a state when the validity of a state
statute 'is questioned on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution of
the United States. Has been held to cover a state constitutional provision.
19481
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and the prosecution commented on this fact to the jury, this being permissible under
the state constitutions and penal code,6 and it is upon these provisions that Adam-
son bases his contentions of unconstitutionality before the Supreme Court of the
United States.
Adamson was also charged in the information with former convictions for bur-
glary, larceny and robbery. He answered the information and admitted he had
suffered the previous convictions. This barred allusion to these charges of convic-
tions on the trial.7 Thus Adamson, who was a repeated offender, was forced to
choose between the risk of having his prior offenses disclosed to the jury or of having
the attention of the jury drawn to the fact that he did not testify by comment
from the court and prosecutor and it being told that it could draw harmful infer-
ences from uncontradicted evidence that could only be denied' or explained by the
defendant.
Adamson urged "that the provision of the Fifth Amendment that no person
'shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself' is a funda-
mental national privilege or immunity protected against state abridgment by the
Fourteenth Amendment or a privilege or immunity secured, through the Four-
teexth Amendment, against deprivation by state action because it is a personal
right, enumerated in the Federal Bill of Rights."
Adamson also relied upon the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to invalidate the provisions of the' California laws permitting comment
by court or prosecutor on failure to testify to the jury and allowing the jury or
court to consider that fact), and "as applied (a) because comment on failure to
testify is permitted, (b) because he was forced to forego testimony in person be-
cause of danger of disclosure of his past convictions through cross-examination and
(c) because the presumption of innocence was infringed'by the shifting of the bur-
den of proof to him in permitting comment on his failure to testify."
S. CAL. CONsT., Art. I, § i3: "... but in any criminal case, whether the
defendant testifies or not, his failure to explain or to deny by his testimony any
evidence or facts in the case against him maybe commented upon by the court and
by the counsel, and may be considered by the court or the jury...."
6. CAL. PENAL CODE, § 1323: "A defendant in a criminal action or pro-
ceeding cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself; but if he offers himpelf
as a witness, he may be cross-exam ' ined by the counsel for the people as to all
matters about which he was examined in chief. The failure of the defendant to
explain or to deny by his testimony any evidence or facts in the case against him
may be commented upon by counsel."
Note: New Jersey, Connecticut, Ohio and' Vermont have similar statutes.
8 WIGMORE, EvIDENcE, p. 413 (3d ed. 1940).
7. CAL. PENAL CODE, § 1025: ". . . In case the defendant pleads not guilty,
and answers that he has suffered the previous conviction, the charge of the
previous conviction must not be read to the jury, nor alluded to on the trial,"
Note: California courts hold this section not to prohibit the prosecution from
bringing out on cross-examination the fact that the defendant has been previously
convicted. Such testimony to be used as impeachment. People v. Adamson, 27 Cal.
2d 478, 494, 165 P. 2d 3, 11 (1946); People v. Braun, 14 Cal. 2d 1, 6, 92 P. 2d 402
(1939).
8. See notes 5 and 6 supra.
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The instructions and comments by the California court and prosecutor should
be noted here before the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Reed and the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Black are considered. The trial court said "It is the right
of court and counsel to comment on the failure of defendant to explain or deny
any evidence against him ... ; yet the jurors are the exclusive judges of all ques-
tions of fact submitted to them and of the credibility of witnesses." The Supreme
Court of California9 , held this 'instruction general but alright, and indicated that
the jury should have been instructed that the defendant's failure to deny or explain
evidence presented against him does not create a presumption or warrant an infer-
ence of guilt, but should be considered only in relation to evidence 'that he fails to
explain or deny; and that if it appears from the evidence that defendant couild
reasonably be expected to explain or deny evidence presented against him, the jury
may consider his failure to do so as tending to indicate the truth of such evidence
and as indicating that among the inferences that may reasonably be drawn there-
from, those unfavorable to-the defendant are the more probable.10
During the trial the prosecutor commented seven times in his oral argument
on the fact of defendant's silence. During his closing argument it was said, "In
conclusion, I am going to make this one statement to you: counsel asked you to
find this defendant not guilty. But does the defendant get on the stand and say
under oath, 'I am not guilty?' Not one word from him, and not one word from a
single witness. I leave the case in your hands." The California Supreme Court
said that this was close to the borderline as it could be construed as a declaration
that the jury should infer guilt solely from defendant's silence.
Mr. Justice Reed, speaking for the majority, upheld the constitutionality of
the California statute.1 In answer to defendant's first contention, the Fourteenth
Amendment was held not to make effective the clause of the Fifth Amendment in
question, i.e., "no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself," as a protection against state action. The court noted that "the
Fourteenth Amendment forbids a state from abridging the privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States," and held that as a matter of words, "this left
a state free to abridge, within the limits of the due process clause, the-privileges and
immunities flowing from state citizenship." With regard to the second contention
9. 27 Cal 2d 478, 165 P. 2d 3 (1946).
10. Reeder, Comment Upon. Failure of Accused to Testify, 31 MICH. L. REv.
40, 58 (1932). If comment is allowed ". . . It should ... be made as clear as the
English language can make it that the burden of proof is always on the prosecution,
that the accused is never obliged to testify, and that the only inference which may
be properly drawn from a failure to testify is that which a competent person would
naturally draw under all the circumstances."
11. Note that the court does not indicate what presumption of validity is
given this state statute. It is probable that the doctrine of reasonable doubt was
applied. Query, if this is correct under the statement of Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U. S. 158, 173 (1944). There religious freedom was involved and Mr. Justice
Murph believed that the court was not aided by any strong presumption of validity
of the statute. Should not the same rule apply as to personal rights?
11
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it was held that the due process clause does not protect the accused's freedom from
giving testimony by compulsion in state trials, and "for the state to require testi-
mony by the accused is not necessarily a breach of a state's obligation to give a
fair trial."
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter noted that "Sensible and just-
minded men, in important affairs of life, deem it significant that a man remains
silent when confronted with serious and responsible evidence against himself which
it is within his power to contradict. The notion that to allow jurors to do that which
sensible and right-minded men do every day violated the 'immutable principles of
justice' as conceived by a civilized society is to trivialize the importance of 'due
process.'"
This decision is a re-affirmance of the holding of Twining v. New Jersey= and
shows the court reluctant to extend the doctrine pronounced in Gitlow v. State of
New York, Near v. State of Minnesota ex rel. Olson, Dejonge v. Oregon, and
Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California.3 These latter cases indicated
that the court would, under certain circumstances, hold that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment operated to apply some of the first eight amendments to the states. The deci-
sion in the principal case shows that as yet the court is not ready to make a blanket
holding that all the Bill of Rights limit state action.
Mr. Justice Black wrote the dissenting opinion,' 4 to which was attached an
Appendix setting forth the historical background" of the first section of the Four-
12. 211 U. S. 78 (1908). Twining was convicted of a high misdemeanor in
,deceiving a state bank examiner. A state statute allowed comment on failure to
testify. The United States Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Moody,
said the power to ffee defendants in state trials from self-incrimination was beyond
the scope of the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the due process clause does not protect the accused's freedom from giving testi-
mony by compulsion in state trials.
13. Gitlow case, 268 U. S. 652 (1925); Near case, 283 U. S. 697 (1931);
De Jonge case, 299 U. S. 353 (1937); Hamilton case, 293 U. S. 245 (1934). In the
Gitlow case the Supreme Court, without argument, "assumed" that freedom of
speech and of the press, which are protected by the First Amendment from abridg-
ment by Congress, are among the fundamental personal rights and "liberties"
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impair-
ment by the states. The Near case dealt with freedom of the press. In the De Jonge
case the right of freedom of assembly was likewise protected. The Hamilton casedealt with religious liberty and freedom of teaching.
14. Mr. Justice Murphy wrote a short dissenting opinion -in which Mr. Justice
Rutledge concurred. Mr. Justice Douglas joined in with Mr. Justice Black.
15. The historical treatment by Mr. Justice Black only deals with the legisla-
-tive origin of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment.. It contains direct
'luotations from the official committee ,reports of the Joint Committee on Recon-
•struction, as well as the debates in Congress taken from the congressional reports.
A representative statement is one reported in the Senate debate on May 23, 1866,
"... the first eight amendments . . . do not operate in the slightest degree as a
restraint or a prohibition upon state legislation. . . . The great object of the first
section of this amendment is, therefore, to restrain the power of the states and
compel them at all times to respect these great fundamental Guarantees . .
.'upra note 1 at 1703.
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teenth Amendment. The dissent contended that the Court should place itself as
nearly as possible in the condition of the men who framed the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and the majority is accused of refusing to appraise the relevant historical
evidence of the intended scope of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Mr. Justice Black deplores the practice of allowing the current conception of
fundamental rights, as held by the Court, to dictate which of the Bill of Rights
shall be held to apply to the various states through the medium of the Fourteenth
Amendment
The dissent points up the fundamental differences in iiews between it and
the majority opinion. Using a historical argument the dissent maintains that all
of the Bill of Rights were meant to be made to apply to the states by the first
section of the Fourteenth Amendment. The majority view shows how the Court
has actually brought about the application of some of the Bill of Rights to the
states, i.e., by a piecemeal application according to the individual views of the par-
ticular court at a particular period of time. Thus freedom of speech and press,
freedom of assembly, and freedom of religion have been considered "fundamental"
t9 the extent that the Court, at that particular time, would be willing to hold them
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from crippling legislation by a state. Not
so the right not-to be compelled to be a witness against himself.
The dissenting opinion is ended with, "In my judgment the people of no
nation can lose their liberty so long as the Bill of Rights like ours survives and its
basic purposes are conscientiously interpreted, enforced and respected so as to
afford continuous protection against old, as well as new, devices and practices which,
might thwart those purposes. I fear to see the conseqfiences of the Court's prac-
tice of substituting its own concepts of decency and fundamental justice for the
language of the Bill of Rights at its point of departure in interpreting and enforcing
that Bill of Rights. . . . To hold that this Court can determine what, if any, pro-
visions of the Bill of Rights will be enforced, and if so to what degree, is to frustrate
the great design of a written constitution."
CEARLEs B. FITZGERALD
CORPORATIONS-DISREGARDING CORPORATE ENTITY TO DISCLOSE EVASION OF
JUDGMENT OF OUSTER
State on inf. McKittrick v. Kooii-
The Barry County Burial Association, organized by one W. Bradley, and the
instant respondents, Mr. and Mrs. W. D. Koon, was granted a pro forma decree, as
a benevolent corporation, in 1934, and, immediately thereafter, exercised its pre-
sumed franchise of writing and selling policies of funeral and burial insurance in
Missouri. In 1940, however, the statute2 under which the association had been
1. 201 S. W. 2d 446 (Mo. 1947).
2. Mo. REV. STAT. § 5014 (1929).
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formed, was declared unconstitutional and void," and the attorney general filed an
information in quo warranto against the association's creators, charging them with
unlawfully exercising the aforementioned franchise and with purporting to be a
corporation. 4 Upon request, the attorney general granted the respondents ninety
days to return certain monies to the association's policy-holders, in exchange for
respondents' promise to confess judgment of ouster, and, on Jan. 12, 1942, the
supreme court entered final judgment, ousting the respondents from holding them-
selves out to be a corporation and from further usurping the franchise of writing
and selling funeral and burial insurance in Missouri. However, unknown to in-
formant and the court, the respondents and their daughter had duly incorporated
the Barry County Burial Association under the laws of Arkansas in the interim;
and, subsequent to the judgment of ouster, the records of their former ill-fated
venture were transferred to the Arkansas association, new policies were issued in
exchange for the old ones, and the identical business was conducted with renewed
vigor. When knowledge of these facts came to informant, the respondents were
proceeded against for contempt, the basic contention being that they had knowingly
violated the judgment of ouster. The supreme court unanimously sustained this
contention and adjudged the respondents guilty of criminal contempt. Speaking
through Conkling, J., the court declared that the corporate entity of the Arkansas
association would be disregarded in this proceeding, as it had been used as a means
of perpetrating a fraud upon the court. 5
This conclusion elicits consideration of a problem which has warranted much
attention since the turn of the century, namely, under what circumstances a court
of law or equity6 will disregard the corporate fiction,7 for it is conceded that the
use of the entity privilege of separate capacities is at all times subject to limita-
tions of an equitable nature."
Perhaps the best statement of the basic considerations which this question
evokes was tersely set forth by Sanborn, J., in a much quoted federal case as
follows: 9
"A corporation will be looked upon as a legal entity as a general rule,
and until sufficient reason to the contrary appears; but when the notion
3. State ex inf. Williamson v. Black, 347 Mo. 19, 145 S. W. 2d 406 (1940).
The court found that § 5014 violated Mo. CONST. Art. 10, § 21 (1875).
4. As the Association had been organized as a "benevolent corporation,"
supra note 2, the respondents had neglected to comply with Mo. REV. STAT. § § 6003,
6004 (1939) which set out certain prerequisites for engaging in the business of
insurance.
5. S'pra note 1 at p.. 45 5 .
6. It is suggested in 10 MINN. L. REV. 598 (1926) that, originally, both courts
and legal scholars contended that only a court of equity could reach the individuals
behind the corporate entity.
7. 1 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 41
(perm. ed. 1931); Wormser, Piercing the Veil of Corporate Entity, 12 COL. L. REV.
496 (1912); notes, 37 MICH. L. REV. 314 (1938); 36 YALE L. J. 254 (1926).
8. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 122 (Rev. ed. 1946).
9. United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 Fed. 247, 255(E. D. Wisc. 1905).
[Vol. 13
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of legal entity, is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect
fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard the corporation as an associa-
tion of persons."
Using this broad statement as a beacon light,'the courts of this country have
"pierced the corporate veil," or, abhorring such strong invective, have "drawn aside
the corporate cloak" in instances where there has been an attempt to do corporate
business without providing any sufficient basis of financial responsibility to credi-
tors,10 where the corporate entity has been used to evade contracts," where there
has been a transfer of assets to or by a corporation to hinder, delay, or defraud
creditors,12 where the corporate entity has been employed to evade statutes,13 etc.
It will be readily seen that these situations fall smoothly within the scope of Judge
Sanborn's broad declaration; in each instance, the purpose for which the corporation
was formed was to abuse the privileges resulting from incorporation, and the
creators were, therefore, rightly denied the shield of the corporate entity.
Applying this analysis to the Koon case, however, it is a little less than clear
how the court reached its conclusion. The respondents had been ousted from sell-
ing funeral and burial insurance in Missouri solely because the statute under which
they had incorporated was unconstitutional. Respondents had made a bona fide
attempt to comply with Missouri's laws and had engaged in pursuits expressly per-
mitted by the statute in question; if mistake there was at this point, it was a rea-
sonable mistake caused by justifiable reliance in a statute duly enacted by this
state's legislature.
After ouster, respondents then went into Arkansas and duly incorporated under
the laws of that state. No law of Missouri was violated by the Arkansas corpora-
tion's engaging in selling funeral insurance in Missouri; in fact, the court plainly
stated' 4 that te question was not whether the Arkansas association was doing
business in Missouri without a license or without complying with Missouri laws
10. Dixie Coal Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. Williams, 221 Ala. 331, 128
So. 799 (1930); Mosher v. Salt River Valley Water Users' Association, 39 Ariz. 567,
8 P. 2d 1077 (1932); Shea v. Leonis, 14 Cal. 2d,666, 96 P. 2d 332 (1939);
Biscayne Realty & Ins. Co. v. Ostend Realty Co., 109 Fla. 1, 148 So. 560 (1933);
Hanson v. Bradley, 298 Mass. 371, 10 N.E. 2d 259 (1937); Rogers-Elbert Co.
v. Century Construction Co., 131 N. J. Eq. 67, 23 A. 2d 905 (1941).
11. Yost v. Patrick, 245 Ala. 275, 17 So. 2d 240 (1944); Blank v. Olcovich
Shoe Corp., 20 Cal. App. 2d 456, 67 P. 2d 376 (1937); Dairy Co-operative
Ass'n. v. Brandes Creamery, 147 Ore. 488, 30 P. 2d 338 (1934); Contra: Berry
v. Old South Engraving Co., 283 Mass. 441, 186 N. E. 601 (1933).
12. Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U. S. 215 (1941); Sweet
v. Watson's Nursery, 33 Cal. App. 2d 699, 92 P. 2d 812 (1939); Riesen v. Mary-
land Casualty Co., 153 Fla. 205, 14 So. 2 d 197 (1943); Central Motors & Supply
Co. v. Brown, 219 Minn. 467, 18 N. W. 2d 236 (1945); Cohen v. Dwyer, 133 N. J.
Eq. 226, 31 A. 2d 764 (1943).
13. Paymer v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 150 F. 2d 334 (C.C.A.
2nd 1945); United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 Fed. 247
(E. D. Wis. 1905); People v. Allen, 47 Cal. App. 2d 735, 118 P. 2d 927 (1941);
People ex rel. Potter v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 246 Mich. 198, 224 N. W.
438 (1929); In re Patterson, 350 Pa. 601, 39 A. 2d 832 (1944).
14. Supra note 1 at p. 454.
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respecting foreign corporations.15 The respondents were only barred from exercising
a franchise which had not been granted to them by a valid statute, but after the
privilege of selling funeral insurance had been legally conferred upon them, whether
by Arkansas or Missouri, it would seem that, logically, no violation of the judg-
ment of ouster could follow. It was not claimed by the court that persons other
than these particular respondents could not have incorporated under Arkansas
law and thereafter have engaged in writing and selling funeral insurance in Missouri.
The purpose of the respondents in thus incorporating was to embark in a legitimate
enterprise, and there is extreme difficulty in finding any abuse of the corporate
privileges.
Cases upon this precise point are few, but the language employed by courts
in which this question has presented itself also would seem to point to an opposite
result.'In Belding v. State,"' for example, the defendant had been practicing the
profession of medicine without having obtained a license required by law or a cer-
tificate of qualification from the state board of medical examiners. The court de-
creed that the defendant be ,prohibited from practicing such profession, but, in a
significant dictum, averred that this decree would not exclude the defendant from
practicing medicine after"' he had become legally qualified.
The issue next arose in a Texas Civil Appeals case.18 In that case, a judgment
of quo warranto had declared void all orders issued by a county school board with
reference to annexing common school districts to an independent district, the orders
not being issued in compliance with a particular statute. In subsequent proceedings,
the court held that the judgment, although binding upon all parties affected
thereby, did not deprive the county board of the right thereafter to proceed to
create a new rural school district under authority of statute.
The case of State ex inf. Gentry v. American Can Co., 9 decided by Missouri's
Supreme Court, is also sufficiently close in point to bear careful consideration.
There, a judgment of ouster and dissolution had been entered against a Missouri
corporation for abuse of its corporate franchise. Immediately thereafter, a new cor-
poration, bearing the same name, was duly organized under Missouri's laws, and
the attoiney general proceeded against its creators for contempt, alleging an attempt
to defeat the ouster judgment. The supreme court tersely stated that after a judg-
ment of ouster /and dissolution had been rendered against a private corporation, it
was a matter of indifference to the state that a new corporation, complying with
15. It is conceded that a foreign corporation which abuses its privileges and
franchises within Missouri, or violates its laws, may be ousted in quo warranto.
State on inf. Taylor v. American Ins. Co., 200 S. W. 2d 1 (Mo. 1947); State cx
rel. Barrett v. First National Bank, 297 Mo. 397, 249 S. W. 619 (1923); State ex inf.
Crow v. Armour Packing Co., 173 Mo. 356, 73 S. W. 645 (1903).
16. 214 Ala. 380, 107 So. 853 (1926).
17. Italics added.
18. County Board of School Trustees of Hale County v. Mayfield Common
School Dist., 140 S. W. 2d 956 (Tex. App. 1940).
19. 12 S. W. 2d 437 (Mo. 1929).
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the general laws relating to the organization of corporations, had appropriated the
name of the extinct corporation and was conducting a similar business.
Thus, these three cases would seem to be in accord upon the proposition that
once the laws of a state have been complied with, the subsequent operation of a
legitimate business will not be violative of a prior judgment of ouster, entered be-
cause statutory requiremefits had not been met. The facts of the Koon case would
seem to present even a stronger argument for so holding, for, in the cases just
referred to, the parties in question clearly were not complying with the law; in the
principal case, on the other hand, the respondents had complied, to the letter, with
the statute which then existed, and certainly could not have reasonably contem-
plated that it subsequently would be declared unconstitutional. Thus, the decision
in the principal case would seem in direct conflict with the reasoning 2 of the cases
just considered.
The holding of the Koon case, however, might be buttressed by State Board
of Funeral Directors and Embalmers v. Cooksey.21 In this case, the license of
defendant, a funeral director, was revoked, and the court prohibited him from
engaging, either directly or indirectly, in the business of funeral directing. The
facts are not clear, but it seems that a corporation was thereafter formed under
applicable statutes, and that the defendant was elected an officer. When the cor-
poration engaged in funeral directing, the defendant was immediately cited for
contempt, and the Florida court adjudged him guilty thereof, declaring that the
corporation had been employed as a means of evading the restraining order.
However, as support for the Koon case, this decision is weakened by the fact
that the defendant was not licensed as required by law to perform the duties of a
funeral director, and, although not clear, there seems to have been some evidence
that he had performed such services for the corporation. In the Koon case, how-
ver, the respondents had met all statutory requireinents. They had duly incor-
porated the Arkansas association and were engaged in a profession which violated
no law of Missouri. Quaere, therefore, whether in this case, the Missouri court was
justified in disregarding the corporate entity.
CHARLEs E. DAPRON JR.
20. The language employed in State ex inf. Williamson v. Black et al., 347
Mo. 19, 145 S. W. 2d 406 (1940), and State v. Mutual Mortuary Association, 166
Tenn. 260, 61 S. W. 2d 664 (1933), both "burial association" cases, would also
seem to indicate that once the association's members had incorporated under the
proper statute, the state would no longer be concerned. Both courts conceded that
the association was subject to ouster, but suggested that the trial court allow rea-
sonable time to permit re-incorporation under applicable statutes. Accord, State
ex rel. Troy v. Lumbermen's Clinic, 186 Wash. 384, 58 P. 2d 812 (1936).
21. 21 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 1945).
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CRIMINAL LAw-DSTINCTION BETWEEN LARCENY AND EMBEZZLEMENT IN
INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION REMOVED BY STATUTE
State V. Ward
In a prosecution for the theft of an automobile, the defendant, who had been
charged by information with the larceny thereof, was convicted of embezzlement
of the vehicle. The defendant had been left in charge of his employer's house and
Ford pick-up truck, and he had taken the truck to Colorado and sold it. At the
trial, the court directed the jury to find the defendant not guilty of larceny and sub-
mitted to thera the question of embezzlement. The jury returned a verdict finding
the defendant not guilty of larceny, and guilty of embezzlement. The defendant
contended that the verdict was erroneous because it was not a general verdict in
that it did not contain the words "as charged in the informatiou" after the finding
of guilty, and as a special verdict it was bad because it did not contain a finding
of all the essential elements of the crime of embezzlement.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that under Section 4842, Mis-
souri Revised Statutes, 1939, a person who had been charged with larceny, could
be found guilty of embezzlement,.where the proof was such as to warrant a con-
viction thereon, and consequently, if the verdict made reference to the information,
it would be subject to attack for not being responsive to it, because the charge
therein was larceny. They held that the verdict did what the staiute authorized
by finding the defendant not guilty of larceny and guilty of embezzlement, and that
it was in form a general verdict specifically authorized by the statute.
For many years, the close relationship between the crimes of larceny and em-
bezzlement has created a problem for the courts, and the distinction between the
two has caused considerable controversy. The English courts early recognized ,the
crime of larceny, but it was restricted to the case where there had been a direct
overt taking of the goads from another's possession without his consent.2 From time
to time, cases would arise in which, because of the peculiar circumstances, the facts
were such that the party charged could not be convicted, and with each new case,
the courts were forced to be more liberal in their interpretation of the law, or
Parliament would have to remedy the situation by statute. So it was that in 1473,
in the "carriers" case, 8 the court took the view that although a carrier received the
property lawfully from the owner, yet when he broke open the package the property
immediately reverted to the "possession" of the consignor, and the removal of the
merchandise then provided the technically necessary "trespass," and they held the
defendant guilty of larceny.' This extension of the law opened the door for the in-
clusion of many types of behavior which had previously been treated as relatively
innocuous.4
1. 202 S. W. 2d 46 (Mo. 1947).
2. Rex. v. Raven, Kelyng 24, 84 Eng. Rep. .1065 (1663); 2 POLLOCK AND
MAITILAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 498 (2d Ed. 1923).
3. Carriers Case, 2 East P. C. 697 (1473).
4. HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SociETY 4 (1935).
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In 1529 it was definitely established that where a servant received property
from his master and converted it, such was larceny, because the servant did not have
possession thereof, but merely custody.5 However, property received from a third
person for the master was in the servant's possession, and he was therefore not
guilty of a felony if he converted it.r Consequently, after 1529, one who converted
goods entrusted to him by his master, or a bailee who broke open packages and then
converted the contents, could be prosecuted for felony, but this still left a great area
within which one could convert property rightfully belonging to another and be
free from prosecution therefor. Except for a statute in 15417 dealing with cheating
by false token, the law of theft remained unchanged until in the 18th century,
when, due to the expanding economic enterprises in England, certain cases arose
with which the law was unable to cope.
With the organization of the Bank of England in 1694, it became necessary for
clerks to handle large sums of money, and as much of this money was presented
to the clerks by third persons, a conversion thereof would not render the clerk
liable in a criminal action. Consequently, in 1742, Parliament passed, the first
embezzlement statute." However, these statutes were special in nature and it was
not until 1799 that Parliament found it necessary to pass a general embezzlement
statute.9 By the means of the various statutes which were passed as the occasion
arose, Parliament as well as the governing bodies in the United States, have sup-
plemented the common law of larceny, until the conversion of property belonging
to another, regardless of the factor of possession, is a crime.
However, even though the statutory developments today are sufficient to cover
the entire field of criminal conversion, still in cases in which it is somewhat difficult
to distinguish between larceny and embezzlement, many indictments have failed
because they charged the defendant with the commission of one crime (i.e., larceny),
while the facts brought out at the trial showed that he was guilty of another offense
(i.e., embezzlement). To remedy this situation, the Missouri Legislature enacted
a statute which made it possible to charge one with larceny, and then if the facts
showed that the defendant did actually take the goods in such a manner as to con-
5. 21 HEN. VIII, c. 7 -(1529).
6. 1 Hale, P. C. 668 (1736).
7. 33 HEN. VIII, c. 1 (1541).
8. 15 GEo. II, c. 13, sec. 12 (1742). However this statute only related to
embezzlement by officers and servants of- the Bank of England. But later a similar
statute was passed which applied to officers or servants of the South Sea Company,
24 GEO. II, c. 11, sec. 3 (1751). This was followed by a third such statute which
covered the employees of the post office, 5 GEo. III, c. 25 (1765).
9. 39 GEO. III, c. 85 (1799). This statute was brought about when the courts
found themselves unable to convict one Joseph Bazeley, a teller for a firm of bankers,
who had converted a note for 100 pounds given him by a third person. King v.
Bazeley, 2 Leach 835, 168 Eng. Rep. 517 (1799). Even this statute only applied to
servants and clerks and when in 1812, one Walsh, a stock broker (agent), could not
be convicted when he converted a large sum of money given him to invest, Parlia-
ment passed legislation to cover such cases in the future. 52 GEo. III, c. 63 (1812).
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stitute embezzlement, to convict him of that offense.10 This did away with the
necessity of having a new trial, and the possibility of the defendant being acquitted
at both trials, which might otherwise arise in such a situation."- The constitu-
tionality of this statute was brought into question upon several occasions, and in
1898, the Supreme Court of Missouri, in State v. Thompsoni2 decided that where
a defendant was charged with larceny and the facts showed that he was guilty of
embezzlement, the jury could so find under the statute in question, and that said
statute did not violate the Constitution of Missouri,13 because "as the crime of
embezzlement was a lower giade of larceny, and as the punishment was the same,
and as less proof was necessary in a prosecution for embezzlement than for larceny,
and as the same kind of evidence was admissible and the same defenses available
in both cases, the defendant was not deprived of any right guaranteed by the con-
stitution." However, in 1901 the Supreme Court of Missouri decided in State v.
Burks 4 that a statute allowing one cliarged with embezzlement to be convicted
of larceny was in conflict with Article II, Section 22 of the Missouri Constitution
10. Mo. REV. STATUTES, c. 50, § 15 (1855): "If, upon the trial of any person
indicted for embezzlement, it shall be proved that he took the property in ques-
tion, in any such manner as to amount, in law, to larceny, he shall not by reason
thereof be entitled to be acquitted, but the jury shall return as their verdict that
such person is not guilty of embezzlement, but is guilty of larceny, and thereupon
such person shall be liable to be punished in the same manner as if he had been
convicted upon an indictment for such larceny; and if, upon the trial of any person
indicted for larceny, it shall be proved that he took the property in question in any
such manner as to amount, in law, to embezzlement, he shall not by reason thereof,
be entitled to be acquitted, but the jury shall return as their verdict, that such'
person is not guilty of larceny, but is guilty of embezzlement, and thereupon such
person shall be liable to be punished in the same manner as if he had been convicted
upon an indictment for such embezzlement..."
11. In Commonwealth v. O'Mally, 97 Mass. 584 (1867) the defendant wasindicted of larceny and acquitted. He later was indicted of embezzlement on the
same facts and convicted, but on appeal the conviction was set aside on the grounds
that the offense was larceny. Note, 20 COL. L. REv. 318, 323 (1920): "No more
unseemly spectacle can exist in a court of justice than that of a defendant ad-
mittedly guilty of some sort of theft (in the broad sense of the term) who must
nevertheless, either go free or receive a new trial merely because the particular char-
acter of his theft has not been properly set forth in the indictment."
12. 144 Mo. 314, 322, 46 S. W. 191, 194 (1898).
13. Mo. CONsT. Art. II, Sec. 22 (1875).
14. 159 Mo. 568, 60 S. W. 1100 (1901). The statute involved in that case
was Mo. REv. STAT. § 3551 (1889), which was intended to make the crime of em-
bezzlement punishable as if it were larceny, and the case did not pertain to the
statute in question. However, the court did in the Burks case, overrule the case of
State v. Broderick, 70 Mo. 622 (1879) which allowed a conviction of larceny on a
charge of embezzlement as per the statute in question. The court seemed to think
that under such a statute, the defendant was not given an opportunity to know
the nature of the crime with which he was accused, because the crime of larceny
was a crime of a higher grade, requiring additional proof (i.e., that of trespass in
the taking of the property involved). When the Thompson case and the Burks case
are considered together, it seems difficult to understand how the defendant is any
more deprived of his right to know the nature of the crime with which he is charged
in one case than in the other.
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW (Vol. 13108 ,
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(1875) in that it deprived him of the right to know with what crime he was charged.
The court in the Burks case, held that if there was any doubt as to whether the
offense was embezzlement or larceny, there should have been a separate count in
the indictment for each offense. Because of the ruling in the Burks case, the
legislature amended the statute in question to leave out the part stating that if the
defendant was charged with embezzlement, he could be convicted of larceny,' and
the courts have accepted the statute on the strength of the decision in State v.
Thompson, as to its constitutionality.
In the recent case of State v. RoussinO the question arose whether the de-
fendant, who while employed by the city of St. Louis converted money collected
by his department, and who was charged with larceny, could be found guilty of
embjezzlement. The court reversed the conviction, stating that such a conviction
under the general larceny statute could not stand where the evidence established
an embezzlement only.'7 However, in that case, the lower court failed to instruct
the jury that if they found the facts to constitute the crime of embezzlement, to
find the defendant not guilty of larceny and guilty of embezzlement, but merely
told them to find the defendant guilty of 'embezzlement. Consequently, the statute
under discussion'was not followed, and as it was established in the case of State v.
Rosefelt,'8 that the verdict must. be "guilty of embezzlement, and not guilty of
larceny," and that a general verdict of guilty would not be sufficient." the failure
to follow the statute was fatal.
Thus Missouri, by this statute has taken a step in the direction of removing
the difficulty of distinguishing between larceny and embezzlement, at least to the
point of removing to some extent the danger of misnomer of the crime in the in-
dictment or information.' This has saved the state a great deal of time and money,
in that prior to' the statute, such, defendants would have to be acquitted of the
crime with which they were charged, and a new indictment or information would
have been required. A great many states have taken steps to remove the danger
of misnomer of the crime, but some states have gone even further' and have at-
tempted to merge the crimes of larceny, embezzlement and false pretenses into one
crime. In New York, the legislature has passed a law consolidating all three of the
crimes into one crime called larceny.20 The state of California has enacted a Theft
Statute,21 in which theft is defined as including the crimes of larceny, embezzlement
and obtaining property under'false -pretenses. -And in Massachusetts, the statute of
larceny covers larceny, embezzlement and obtaining property under false pretenses,
15. Mo. Laws 1919, Sec. 4901.
16. 189 S. W. 2d 983 (1945).
17. In State v. Harmon, 106 Mo. 635, 18 S. W. 128 (1891), the court stated
that where the defendant was indicted of larceny the fact that the evidence showed
embezzlement, would not authorize a conviction of larceny. The defendant was
entitled to know the nature of the crime with which he was charged.
18. 184 S. W. 904 (Mo. App. 1916).
19. Mo. v. Cornwall, 88 Mo. App. 190 (1901).
20. N. Y. CONSOL. LAW, c. 40, § 1290 (1939).
21. PENAL CODE OF CALIF. § 484 (1941).
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and an indictment need only set out facts sufficient to form any one of those crimes.1-
Another provision gives the defendant the right to demand a bill of particulars, thus
keeping the statute with-in constitutional limits. However, in all these states, the
courts have held that. although the indictment need only charge the crime as con-
solidated, no elements of the former crimes have been changed, and in a trial for
theft committed in any of the three ways, the same degree of proof is necessary as
was, required before the consolidation.23 An indictment charging facts amounting
t9 one of the common law crimes covered by the statute, must be sustained by proof
of facts amounting to that specific crime and no other.24
Section 4842 of the Missouri Revised Statutis, 1939, makes the problem of
distinguishing between larceny and embezzlement much easier, in so far as the
verdict being responsive to the indictment or information is concerned, and has
served its purpose of preventing the possible acquittal of defendants who have
committed a crime, but must be set free because of the failure on the part of th'e
prosecution to distinguish correctly between the crimes of larceny and embezzle-
ment. The necessity of following the statute seems to be of the utmost importance,
and unless the jury is properly instructed thereon, there is a good possibility of a
reversal, as was the case in State v. Roussin. The trial court in the principal case
averted such a reversal by following the instructions set out in the siatute. How-
ever, the statute still will not solve the problem where the defendant is charged with
embezzlement, and as it stands, the prosecution should, where there is any doubt
at all whether the facts involved constitute larceny or embezzlement, either charge
the defendant with larceny, or enter two separate counts covering both offenses.
A statute similar to that in California, where the crimes of larceny, embezzlement,
and obtaining property by false pretenses are consolidated into one offense, would
make it possible for the prosecution to charge the defendant with theft, and to gain
a conviction by showing the commission of any one of the three crimes thereunder.
To be sure, it would still be necessary to prove the same elements necessary for a
conviction today under one of the three crimes, but it would do away with the
necessity of making sure that the crime charged against the defendant in the in-
. formation was technically the same one which could be proved by the facts.
CLARENCE F. HOMAN
REs IPSA LOpUITuR-EFFECT OF PLEADING SPECIFIC NEGLIGENCE
Maxie v. Gulf, M. & . R. Co.1
The plaintiff was employed by the defendant railroad company to rebuild and
repair certain of the defendant's freight cars. While the plaintiff was so engaged
and was stooping over to pick up a board, four heavy box car doors fell upon him
22. MAss. GEN. LAws, c. 266, § 30; c. 277, §§ 40, 41 (1932).
73. People v. Myers, 206 Cal. 480, 275 Pac. 219 (1929).
24. People v. Bremereur, 101 Misc. 156, 166 N. Y. Supp. 801 (1917); People
v. Dumar, 106 N. Y. 502, 13 N. E. 325 (1887).
1. 202 S. W. 2d 904 (Mo. 1947).
[Vol. 13
22
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1948], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol13/iss1/10
crushing him to the ground. The plaintiff had neither seen nor been aware of the
presence of the doors. Plaintiff's petition alleged general negligence of the defendant
in operating his business followed by specific averments of negligence which caused'
the injury. The trial court submitted the case to the jury under the doctrine res
ipsa loquitur. The defendant contended that the court should have sustained the
motion to dis miss because "plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant was guilty
of any negligence." On appeal the supreme court held that the plaintiff had pleaded
specific negligence and said, "after pleading specific negligent acts and omissions,
plaintiff further alleged that the 'foregoing' negligence was the proximate cause of
his injury. By the specific allegations of his petition he was foreclosed from sub-
mitting his cause under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine." The court also explained
"the rule is that 'one who pleads specific acts of negligence must prove such negli-
gence or enough of such acts to justify a recovery, and a failure to do so bars him
from a recovery. And this is true although he might have pleaded negligence gen-
erally and by an invocation of the doctrine res ipsa loquitur had a recovery upon
making proper proof."2 The evidence in the case was sufficient to make a case
for the jury under the doctrine res ipsa loquitur,3 but it was insufficient under the
charge of negligence in the petition. The court then informed the plaintiff that he
might amend his petition to take advantage of the doctrine in the next trial of the
case.
Where a plaintiff has pleaded specific negligence without sufficient evidence to
substantiate it but could have made a case under the doctrine res ipsa loquitur, the
courts have achieved little harmony in their decisions. They have expressed four
distinct views as to the position of a plaintiff who has so framed his petition.4 Tfhese
views are: (1) Pleading the particular cause of the injury does not waive the right
to rely on the doctrine. (2) The right to rely on the doctrine is waived by pleading
the particular cause of the injury. (3) The doctrine is applicable to prove the
particular cause of the injury alleged. (4) Pleading the particular cause of the
injury does not waive the right to rely on the doctrine if general negligence is
alsd alleged.
Those jurisdictions ir which the first view is followed hold that allegations of
specific negligence are to be treated as mere surplusage, and failure to make them
out does not preclude the defendant from using the doctrine res ipsa loquitur. The
jurisdictions supporting this view express the idea that the plaintiff in an attempt
to shed light on th cause of the accident should not be punished if he fails to make
out his specific allegations.
2. A comprehensive note dealing with what constitutes specific and general
averments of negligence and indicating the difficulty of harmonizing the cases is
found in 40 U. oF Mo. BULL. L. SEP. 41 (1928).
3. An exhaustive study of the procedural effect may be found in 3 Mo. L.
REv. 173 (1938). Missouri court rulings on instructions which concern, burden of
proof, going forward with the evidence, and rebuttable presumptions are com-
petently discussed.
4. PRossER, TORTS 307 (1941). An exhaustive annotation of the cases is
found in 79 A. L. R. 48 (1932).
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The second view is supported by cases in a number of jurisdiction among which
is Missouri.5 A plaintiff who pleads specific negligence is deprived of an advantage
which would have been his had he pleaded general negligence only. In this situation
the case must go to the jury in the same manner as any other negligence case, with
the burden of proof on the plaintiff to shov the defendant's negligent acts. Instruc-
tions which put the case on a res ipsa loquitur basis are erroneoiis and grounds for
reversal as in the instant case. In laying down this principle the courts have indi-
cated that a plaintiff, who is sufficiently aware of the facts surrounding his accident
to state them in his petition, has no need f6r the aid of the doctrine as do those who
are injured and have no knowledge of what transpired to cause their injury.
The third class of cases hold that a plaintiff who alleges specific acts of negli-
gence is not deprived of the benefit of the doctrine, but the application of the doc-
trine is limited to the establishment of the particular acts of negligence alleged.0
A few earlier Missouri cases seem to fall into this classification. 7 These cases con-
flict with later Missouri decisions which are listed under the second view. One of
the earlier cases is Askton v. Saint Louis Transit Co.,8 where the plaintiff alleged
certain specific acts of negligence, and the court stated that the evidence and like-
wise the right of recovery was confined to the specific acts charged, but the plain-.
tiff, by showing the happening of the accident, made out a prima facie case and the
burden shifted to the defendant to exculpate and absolve itself from presumptive
and inferred negligence. The result of such specific averments of negligence is that
the defendant need only show himself to be free from the negligence named by the
plaintiff rather than from any negligence as is normally the practice in a res ipsa
loquitur case.
The fourth group of cases resembles most closely those listed in the first group,
for in these jurisdictions a plea of specific negligence will not waive the right to use
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine if in addition there is made a general averment of
negligence. An earlier Missouri case" supporting this theory has been overruled.
5. MacDonald v. Metropolitan Street R. Co., 219 Mo. 468, 118 S. W. 78
(1909); Pointer v. Mountain R. Constr. Co., 269 Mo. 104, 189 S. W. 805, L. R. A.
1917B, 1091 (1916); Porter v. St. Joseph R. Light, Heat & P. Co., 311 Mo. 66, 277
S. W. 913 (1925); and other cases collected in 79 A. L. R. 51 (1932).
6. A well reasoned note supporting the advantages of this theory may be
found in 40 U. oFMo. BULL. L. SER. 41 (1928).
7. Gallagher v. Edison Illuminating Co., 72 Mo. App. 576 (1897); Ashton
v. Saint Louis Transit Co., 105 Mo. App. 226, 79 S. W. 999 (1904); S.Inders v.
Carthage, 9 S. W. 2d 813 (1928), reversed in 330 Mo. 844, 51 S. W. 2d 529 (1932).
8. Supr.
9. Sanders v. Carthage, supra note 7. The case was originally appealed to the
Springfield Court 'of Appeals where a decision was handed down only to be later
reversed by the same court. In the second decision the court admitted the con-
fusion existing in such situations when it said, "It seems to us, on a reconsideration
of the assignment based on plaintiff's instruction No. 7 (a res ipsa loquitur instruc-
tion) that the ruling in the Gannon case supports instruction No. 7. We shall not
attempt to distinguish the case relied upon, and referred to supra, as supporting
our former ruling as to instruction No. 7 and the cases relied on by plaintiffs and
referred to above as supporting the contention that instruction No. 7 is, under
(Vol. 13
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The law in Missouri today seems to have been firmly established in the final
decision of Sanders v. Cartlhage'0 in which the supreme court held that a plaintiff
cannot plead specific negligence and, on failure to prove it, rely on res ipsa loquitur.
This holding is in accord with other Missouri cases in the second classification and
has been supported by all subsequent cases dealing with the problem. 1 Likewise,
proving specific negligence as well as pleading it will prevent a case from being
submitted on the res ipsa loquitur theory.' 2
The instant case illustrates, however, that even though a plaintiff pleads too
much it may not be a fatal error. The Missouri courts have been very liberal in per-
mitting the amendment of petitions so that a technical error will not deprive the
plaintiff of his rights. The cases' 3 indicate that a plaintiff who has a trial court
judgment reversed because of pleading on the wrong theory will be permitted within
limits to amend his petition and plead on the correct theory when the case is retried.
JOHN S. DIViLBiSS
TORTS-LIBEL-A CHARGE OF COMMUNISM
Spanel v. Pegler'
Defendant, Pegler, in an article, stated that one Norvick was associated with
Communists, and called attention to points of similarity between Norvick and the
plaintiff, Spanel. He then quoted from an alleged political advertisement by plain-
tiff, and said, "A native of Russia and an admirer of the Soviet system might be
pardoned in the error." The circuit court of appeals, on a motion to dismiss, held
that the writing was reasonably susceptible of being understood as a charge that
the pleadings, proper and correct. We do not believe the ruling in May v. City of
Hannibal, 186 Mo. App. 602, 172 S. W. 471, and Politowitz v. Citizens' Telephone
Co., 115 Mo. App. 57, 90 S. W. 1031 can be harmonized with the ruling in Gannon
v. Laclede Gaslight Co., 145 Mo. 502, 46 S. W. 968, 47 S. W. 907, 43 L.R.A. 505....
And possibly the same may be true as to the ruling in Grady v. Louisiana Light,
Power and Traction Co. (Mo. App.), 253 S. W. 202, and Kidd v, Kansas City Light
and Power Co. (Mo. App.), 239 S. W. 584."
10. Supra note 7.
11. Smith v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n. of St. Louis, 160 S. W. 2d 476 (Mo. App.
1942); Robinson v. Missouri-Kansas Texas R. Co., 123 S. W. 2d 624 (Mo. App.
1938); Beny v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 343 Mo. 474, 121 S. W. 2d 825
(1938); Taylor v. Missouri Natural Gas Co., 67 S. W. 2d 109 (Mo. App. 1933).
12. Harding v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 188 S. W. 2d 60 (Mo. App.
1945); Smith v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n. of St. Louis, 160 S. W. 2d 476 (Mo. App.
1942); Hughes v. East St. Louis City Lines, 149 S. W. 2d 440 (Mo. App. 1941);
Lochmoeller v. Kiel, 137 S. W. 2d 625 (Mo. App. 1940); State ex rel. Reeves
v. Shain, 122 S. W. 2d 885 (Mo. 1938); Cole v. Uhlmann Grain Co., 340 Mo.
277, 100 S. W. 2d 311 (1936); Grimes c. R. Line Service, Inc., 337 Mo. 743,
85" S. W. 2d 767 (1935); Watts v. Moussette, 337" Mo. 743, 85 S. W. 2d 487
(1935); Dugan v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 56 S. W. 2d 626 (Mo. App. 1933).
13. Smith v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n. of St. Louis, 160 S. W. 2d 476 (Mo. App.
1942); Woodson v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 224 Mo. 685, 123 S. W. 820, 30
L. R. A. (N. S.) 931, 20 Ann. Cas. 1039 (1909).
1. 160 F. 2d 619 (C. C. A. 7th 1947).
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the plaintiff was a Communist or Communist sympathizer; that such a charge was
libelous per se; that, therefore, plaintiff -had stated a cause of action.
The court was governed by an Illinois statute which defined libel as written
words which "tend to expose plaintiff to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, aversion
or disgrace, and to induce an evil opinion of him in the minds of right thinking
persons." 2 This definition is merely a codification of the rule universally followed
by common law courts.3 It is easy to understand, but difficult to apply. Although
as definite as possible in the absence of an actual listing of the charges which will
constitute libel, it is indefinite enough that courts, when called upon for the first
time to determine whether a particular charge will constitute libel, have shown a
marked difference of opinion; and a particular court may be inconsistent. The
question of whether a charge of Communism constitutes libel per se has proven
to be no exception.4 Two recent decisions, like the instant case, have clearly held
it to be libelous per se.5
A review of cases involving charges which carry implications common to 'a
charge of communism will-prove the decision in the instant case to be inescapable.
It has been held that to charge one with being an anarchist is libelous per se, because
an anarchist is commonly understood to be devoted to the object of overthrowing
the existing government by the use of force and the appropriation of private prop-
erty in violation of law, and one having such object will be the subject of hatred,
2. ILL. REv. STAT. c. 38, § 402 (1945).
3. Garriga v. Richfield, 174 Misc. 315, 20 N. Y. 2d 544 (Sup. Ct. 1940):
'Generally speaking, a written false statement which exposes one to public con-
tempt, ridicule, hatred or disgrace, or induces an evil opinion of him in the minds
of fair and right thinking men, is libelous per se." Mitchell v. Bradstreet Co., 116
Mo: 226, 22 S. W. 358 (1893): "Any printed publication that tends to bring a
man into disrepute, ridicule, or contempt is libel, in a legal sense." See NEWELL,
SLANDER AND LIBEL § 31 (3d ed. 1914) for numerous definitions.
4. Toomey v. Jones, 124 Okla. 167, 254 Pac. 736 (1926) (calling one a "Red"
is capable of defamatory meaning and cannot be taken from the jury); Hays v.
American Defense Society, 252 N. Y. 266, 169 N. E. 380 (1929) (implying that a
charge of communism is libelous per se); Garriga v. Richfield, 174 Misc. 315, 20
N. Y. Supp. 2d 544 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (not libelous per se to publish that one is
affiliated with the Communist Party); Levy V. Gelber, 175 Misc. 746, 25 N. Y.
2d 148 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (publication that plaintiff is a Communist is libelous
per se). The courts are not in accord as to the meaning of "libelous per se." If "per
se" means that allegation and proof of special damage is not necessary, as the term
is used in the law of slander, then it would be redundancy, for such allegation and
proof is never necessary in the case of libel, according to the orthodox view. Sydney
v. MacFadden Newspaper Pub. Corp., 242 N. Y. 208, 151 N. E. 209 (1926);
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 569 (1938). Many courts hold that a publication is libelous
per se if proof of extrinsic facts are not necessary to establish its defamatory char-
acter. A few courts add to the confusion by holding thai when a publication is not
libelous per se by reason of the need for proof of extrinsic facts, then there must
be proof of special damages. See 26 IowA L. REv. 893 (1941) for a discussion of
this problem.
5. Grant v. Readers Digest, 151 F. 2d 733 (C. C. A. 2d 1945) (that plain-
tiff was an agent of the Communist Party and a believer in its aims); Wright v.
Farm Journal, 158 F. 2d 976 (C. C. A. 2d 1947) (that plaintiff was a member
of the Communist Party).
(Vol. 13
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contempt and ridicule.6 One of the avowedly necessary steps in the Communists'
rise to power is the forcible overthrow of the existing government and the appro-
priation of private property, this being the primary objective of their activities
in their so-called efforts to improve the lot of the "proletariat."7 The court in one
case discussed at length this element of communism.8 The courts have been unan-
imous in holding that words impugning on'es patriotism are libelous per se.9 To
state that one is a Communist is to impute to 'him a devotion to the leaders of the
Soviet government and their worldwide organization which is inconsistent with a
true allegiance to the United States.' 0 So, in view of the common belief that Com-
munists subordinate the interests of their own. to that of a foreign country; that
6. Cerveny v. Chicago Daily News Co., 139 Ill. 345, 28 N. E. 692 (1891);
Lewis v. Daily News Co., 81 Md. 466, 32 Atl. 246 (1895).
7. MARX AND ENGELS, COMMUNIST MANIFESTO, sec. II (1848): "The Com-
munists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their
ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions."
Although Russian Communist ideology differs somewhat from Marxism, they have
retained the aim of forcibly overthrowing the existing governments and social con-
ditions. In the early days of American Communists they openly declared their in-
tention to overthrow the government. Subsequently they ostensibly rejected this
objective and instead determined to participate in elections and labor movements.
ONEAL, AMERICAN COMMUNISM (1927). In 1922 the Executive Committee of the
Third International adopted a "thesis" instructing the American Communists to
form a "legal" party, involving a surrender of their policy of overthrowing the gov-
ernment. However, they were instructed to maintain an underground party, the
"real Communist Party," which was to control the activities of the "legal" party,
and they were cautioned not to neglect their "illegal work." They were warned
that, on finding themselves "in the easier life of legal activities, many will forget
that no matter what maneuvers may be made upon the public stage, the final class
struggle must be, until its end, a brutal fight of physical force." So although the
Anerican Communists have repeatedly denied any purpose to employ force,
BROWDER, THE PEOPLE'S FRONT 112 (1938), it appears that instead of a change of
principles, there may have been only a change in the tenor of their expressions.
8. Toomey v. Jones, 124 Okla. 167, 254 Pac. 736 (1926)."
9. Choctow Coal and Mining Co. v. Lillich, 204 Ala. 533, 86 So. 383 (1920);
Van Lonkhuyzen v.'Daily News Co., 195 Mich. 283, 161 N. W. 979 (1917); Wells
v. Times Printing Co., 77 Wash. 171, 137 Pac. 457 (1913); Wilkes v.' Shields, 62
Minn. 426, 64 N. W. 921 (1895).
10. The activities of the American Communists have always been under the
rigid control of the Third International (Comintern) in Moscow, receiving their
orders either directly from Moscow or from a representative of the Comintern in
the United States. Their first loyalty was to be to the Comintern rather than to
the country in which they resided. O'NEAL, AMERICAN COMMUNISM (1927); WEST-MEYER, MODERN ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS (1940). This loyalty has been
demonstrated by desperate attempts by the Communists to justify all moves by
the Soviet Government in international affairs, including the invasion of Finland
and the Russo-German pact In view of the long, alliance with Russia through the
Comintern and previous admitted attempts by the Communists to deceive the
public, Americans are not likely to attach much significance to the claim made by
the Communist Party in 1938 that they were no longer a section of the Comintern,
nor to the purported dissolution of the Comintern in 1943. WESTMEYER, op. cirt.
supra, at 287: "Have the Communists really changed their position, or is this merely
a strategic retreat, or, worse yet, is it merely a blind behind which the old party
and the old program still lurks?"
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they propose to forcibly overthrow the government to forcibly seize private prop-
erty, and in so doing, to perpetrate numerous other infamous crimes-both by rea-
son and authority, it is difficult to conceive of a charge which would more surely
lower one in the esteem of his fellow men and hold him up to "hatred, contempt
and ridicule."
It should be noted that it is not necessary that the courts be convinced that
the principles of the American Communists are in reality those referred to above.
They have repeatedly disclaimed any such purposes." But, since the object of the
action of libel is the protection of the reputation, it is the opinion engendered of the
plaintiff in the minds of others as a result of the charge which is the controlling
consideration. It isn't essential that the plaintiff be defamed in the eyes of all those
to whom the defamatory words are communicated;12 nor need their opinions on the
subject be necessarily reasonable.' 3 Therefore, if it is commonly understood that
Communists hold such views, the decision should be the same,' 4 though the court
is of opinion that such common belief is erroneous. The fact that the earlier
decisions showed a greater uncertainty than the most recent ones may have its
explanation in that there was formerly more diversity of opinion in the United
States as to what the American Communists actually stood for than at the present
time. Recent events have done much to bring about an abhorence of Communists."
The purge by the State Department of employees with Communist affiliations has
caused many to believe that a Communist is a virtual'traitor to the United States.
Congress is constantly investigating organizations and individuals with Communist
tendencies, and many have been arrested for various "Un-American activities." Pro-
visions in statutes16 are indicative of the growing popular distrust and hatred of
Communists. The court in the instant case emphasized the importance of con-
sidering only what is in fact the common belief when it said, "Even if these views
may soon be altered and are in truth only the mores of the time, they must be
respected as criteria. If it were libelous per se in 1889 to write of a man as an
11. See notes 7 and 10, supra.
12. Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U. S. 185 (1909); Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo.
App. 652, 134 S. W. 1076 (1911).
13. Meyerson v. Hurlbut, 99 F. 2d 232 (App. D. C. 1938) (a charge that
plaintiff was a price-cutter); Van Wigint6n v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 218 Fed. 795(C. C. A. 9th 1914) (the daughter of a murderer); Katapodis v. Brooklyn Specta-
tor, 287 N. Y. 17, 38 N. E. 2d 112 (1941) (imputation of poverty).
14. Spanel v. Pegler, 160 F. 2d 619 (C. C. A. 6th 1947); Grant v. Readers
Digest, 151 F. 2d 733 (C. C. A. 2d 1945).
15. The public's hatred of Communists was at least as intense in the early
1920's as at the present time, but no cases involving a charge of Communism were
presented for decision during that period.
16. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 892 (1940), 50 U. S. C.
§ 308(i) (1940) (declared the expressed policy of Congress to be that vacancies
created in business by inductions should not be filled by Communists); Emergency
Relief Appropriation Act of 1942, 55 Stat. 396 (1942), 15 U. S. C.1 §§ 721-728(Supp. 1945) (denying the benefits of the act to Communists); Emergency Relief
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anarchist (Cerveny case)' 7 and libelous per se in 1915 to write of a man. as a
socialist (Ogren case)"' it is libelous per se in 1945 to write of a man as a Com-
munist." The rule that the determination of the question cannot be influenced by
the fact that the group in whose opinion the plaintiff has been damaged based
such opinion on erroneous or unreasonable beliefs is limited only to the extent that
such beliefs cannot be clearly anti-social.' 9 So, only- to this extent, is the statement
true that to have actionable libel the plaintiff must be defamed in the minds of
"right thinking" men.
ALVIN C. RANDALL
TRuSTS-PROcEEDS OF MATURED POLICIES OF LIFE INSURANCE HELD ON DEFERRED
PAYMENT PLANS-RIGHT OF CREDITOR OF BENEFICIARY
Mlin v. Trolinger'
This was a creditor's suit brought to subject the proceeds of two matured
policies of life insurance to the payment of a debt owing to plaintiff by the bene-
ficiary named in the policies. The optional method selected by the insured in each
policy provided for payment in specified installments together with interest at three
and one half per centum per annum on the balance from time to time remaining
unpaid. Each policy further provided as follows: "The beneficiary can neither
commute, transfer or encumber any unpaid installments nor withdraw the amount
placed in trust except upon the written authority of the insured filed with the
Company during his lifetime." 2
The Saint Louis Court of Appeals reversed the judgment which had been ren-
dered for plaintiff in the trial court saying that "The policy provision with which
we are here concerned closely resembles a spendthrift trust, if, indeed, it is not in
effect just that."3
The court found it quite convenient to deal with the case as though a trust
fund were involved since, as it points out in the opinion, "Both the respondent and
17. Cerveny v. Chicago Daily News Co., 81 Md. 466, 32 At. 246 (1895).
18. Ogren v. Rockford Star Printing Co., 288 Il. 405, 132 N. E. 587 (1919).
The Socialists, like the Communists, claim to be the true disciples of Marx, and
their policies are similar. The Communists were first organized in the United States
by the members of the "Left Wing" of the Socialist Party who "bolted" in 1919.
In fact, if there is any distinction to be made between the two organizations, there
is more reason for the members of the Communist Party to be the subject of con-
tempt. The Socialist Party has never advocated an overthrow of the government,
but instead has attempted to accomplish its ends by the use of the ballot. Its ap-
plication for affiliation with the Third International was rejected in 1920 because
it did not favor "the forcible overthrow of the capitalist State." The Russian Press
Review, Oct., 1920.
19. Mawe v. Pigott, 4 Ir. R. C. L. 54 (1,869) (defamed in eyes of criminals).
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 785 (1941).
1. 237 Mo. App. 939, 179 S. W. 2d 484 (1944).
2. Id. at 942, 179 S. W. 2d at 486.
3. Id. at 946, 179 S. W. 2d at 488.
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appellants plead that the proceeds of the'policies constitute a trust fund held in
trust by the appellants and made payable to the beneficiary in monthly instal-
ments." However, it seems quite clear that no true trust is involved. In the first
place, no specific fund is set aside to which the beneficiary of the policy may look.
The amount due is a general charge against the mingled funds of the company.
Without the existence of a specific res a trust is impossible.6 In the second place,
it is difficult to see how the insurance company can occupy at one and the same
time the antagonistic positions of obligor and trustee.7 Still further objections may
be noted in the absolute character of the obligation. The insurance company is
bound to pay the full amount of the policy without regard to unforseen develop-
ments, whereas normally a trustee discharges his duty if he exercises due care and
caution in managing the trust and will not be liable for unavoidable depreciations in
value. The agreement of the company is to pay a fixed rate of interest rather than
the income, whatever it may be, from the trust property.8 These and many other
differences might be noted between funds held by an insurance company on de-
ferred payment plans and true trusts. While it is true that many of the earlier
cases analyzed insurance policies in terms of trusts, the more recent cases have not
found it necessary to call upon trust doctrines to protect the rights of the' bene-
ficiary.9 With the almost universal recognition of the rights which vest in a third
party upon the making of a contract for his benefit, he is amply protected without
the necessity of stretching the principles applicable to trusts to an interest vastly
different. The addition of a deferred payment plan to the ordinary policy would
seem only to vary the terms of the debt without changing its essential nature.10
Although the court did not flatly state that it was dealing with a spendthrift
trust, it reasoned on that basis throughout. Its first premise is that the issuance
of a life insurance policy creates an "irrevocable trust" in favor of the beneficiary.
4. Ibid,
5. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Ellis, 125 F. 2d 127, 138 A. L. R. 1478
(C. C. A. 2d 1942), cert. denied sub nom.; Eisenlord v. Ellis, 316 U. S. 665 (1942);
Pierowich v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 282 Mich. 118, 275 N. W. 789 (1937);
Latterman v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 280 N. Y. 102, 19 N. E. 2d 978 (1939);
Black v. New York Life Ins. Co., 126 N. Y. Supp. 334 (Sup. Ct 1910); McLaughlin
v. Equitable Life Assur. Society of the U. S., 112 N. J. Eq. 344, 164 At. 579 (1933);
2 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRuCTxCE §§ 882, 888 (1941); 2 BOGERT, TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES § 240 (1935); RICHARDS, INSURANCE § 385 (4th ed., 1932); 1 ScoTT,
TRUSTS § 87.1 (1939); VANCE, INSURANCE § 158 (2d ed., 1930); Land, Life Insur-
ance Option Settlements-Trusts or Debts, 42 COL. L. Rav. 32 at p. 46 et, seq.
(1942).
6. 1 ScoTT, TRusTs 474 (1939).
7. For a case illustrating the antagonistic character of the relations and some
unfortunate results thereof, see New York Life Insurance Company v. O'Brien, 27
F. 2d 773 (W. D. Mich., 1927), app. dismissed by stipulation, 22 F. 2d 1016
(C. C. A. 6th, 1927) (insurance company attempted to rescind the policies for
fraud).
8. Land supra note 5, at 46.
9. 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 357 and 369 (rev. ed. 1936); VANCE, Op. Cit.
supra § 35.
10. See note 5 supra.
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It then points out that spendthrift trusts are valid in Missouri. Having set
up these two premises it concludes that plaintiff cannot subject the proceeds of
the policies in question to the payment of his debt.. With the proposition that
spendthrift trusts are enforceable in Missouri no issue can be taken.' But it does
seem that the first premise is open to criticism. The court attempts to establish
it by quotations from a number of cases which, for the most part, dealt with the
nature of the right acquired by the beneficiary upon issuance of the policy.' 2 Substan-
tially, the position taken by them was that, in policies where the power to.change
the beneficiary is not reserved by the insured, the beneficiary's right is irrevocable
because, during the insured's life, he is treated as trustee of his claim against the
insurer, for the benefit of the beneficiary. Although the cases cited did speak in
terms of trust, the same result would have been reached by terming him a third.
party donee beneficiary, and this would seem to be more accurate. Let us assume,
however, for purposes of argument, that the insured is a trustee of the promise of the
insurer for the benefit of the beneficiary. This is all that was said by the courts
which were quoted. It by no means follows that upon his death the insurer becomes
a trustee of its own promise. Just how does the insurance company succeed to the
legal claim which the insured, as trustee, held against it for the benefit of the
beneficiary in the policy? This is nowhere pointed out by the court in its opinion.
Even though we leave that troublesome question behind us, we are faced with the
many distinctions previously noted between the relation of the insurance company
and the beneficiary of the policy and that of the usual trustee and his cestui que
trust. It would seem, in view of those distinctions, that no trust is involved.
C
What is involved is the desirability of extending to a debtor-creditor relation-
ship, legal in character, the equitable doctrines which have sustained spendthrift
trusts. By reasoning in terms of trusts in the principal case the court inade it
unnecessary to discuss on its merits the propriety of permitting similar restraints
on the alienation of a legal interest. It has been suggested that due to the peculiar
nature of the insurance contract and the ends sought to be achieved thereby that,
in jurisdictions which permit spendthrift trusts, restraints of the type here involved
should likewise be sanctioned by the courts without resort to the legislature.'5 This
is, of course, the effect of the court's decision in the principal case. But the fact
11. Bixby v. St. Louis Union Trust Company, 323 Mo. 1014, 22 S. W. 2d
813 (1929); Dunephant v. Dickson, 153 Mo. App. 309, 133 S. W. 165 (1910);
Kessner v. Phillips, 189 Mo. 515, 88 S. W. 66, 107 Am. St. Rep. 368, 3 Ann. Cas.
1005 (1905). Also see Nelson, Restraints on Alienation in Missouri, 39 U. oF Mo.
BULL. L. S. 23, 29 (1928).
12. Mullin v. Trolinger, supra at 946, 179 S. W. 2d at 488.
13. Legis., 50 HtAv. L. REv. 511 (1937); Comment, 36 YALE L. J. 394 (1927).
Also see materials cited in Grahame, Insurance Settlement Agreements, 28 IowA L.
REv. 484 at 487 n. 148 (1943). It is interesting to note that Dean Griswold has
changed his position on this matter between the two editions of his work SPEND-
THRIFr TRUSTS. He was at first critical of this suggestion, but now is willing to go
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that statutes dealing with the matter have been passed in half of the states is strong
evidence that the sanction should not be given until the matter has been fully con-
sidered by the policy-making branches of the government.' 4 A number of the cases
strongly relied on by the court were determined by the laws of New York in which
jurisdiction the courts required, and got, legislative action." They would certainly,
then, not be authority for the court in the position which it took.
Whether or not the court permits restraints of this type of its own accord, the
matter should be considered on its merits. Calling the proceeds a trust fund ob-
viates any necessity of doing so. One might well question the desirability of adding
to the great difficulty already encountered by creditors who attempt to satisfy
claims to which our courts have solemnly declared them entitled. One might also
ask whether, if deferred payment arrangements are to be accorded the same pro-
tection as trusts, they should not be subjected to the same requirements relative
to investment, separation of funds, and the like, which serve to protect trust funds
and their administration, and whether it should be necessary for insurance companies
to be specially authorized in their charters to engage in a trust or spendthrift trust
business. An examination of the statutes now in force shows that such questions
have been deemed pertinent and that the legislatures of the different states have
given varying answers to them.' 6 It would seem that these matters, as well as any
other relevant policy determining factors, should be carefully considered before the
principles applicable to spendthrift trusts are extended to the proceeds of matured
life insurance policies held by the insuring companies on deferred payment plans.
None of them were mentioned, or apparently considered, by the court in this case.
GEORGE E. ASHLEY
WILLS-WIDOW'S ELECTIoN-EFFECT OF FAILURE OF GUARDIAN OF INSANE WIow
To RENOUNCE WILL WITHIN TIME SPECIFIED BY STATUTE
First Nat. Bank of Kansas City v. Sckaake'
This was an action to have the court make an election as to whether it would
be for the best interests of testator's insane widow to renounce a provision of his
will in regard to property'bequeathed her or to take one-half of his estate under
the statutes.2 John Schaake -died testate survived by his widow and his brothers
and sisters. His will gave and bequeathed to his wife "all that part of my estate
14. The pertinent statutes are listed in 1 Scorr, TRUSTS § 87.1 (1939, Supp.
1946), and discussed at some length in GRISWOLD, Op. Cit. supra §§ 114 et seq. (2d
ed., 1947).
15. This was true of Crossman Co. v. Rauch, 263 N. Y. 264, 188 N. E. 748
(1934), and also of Tate v. Hain, 181 Va. 402, 25 S. E. 2d 321 (1943).
16. See note 14 supra.
1. 203 S. W. 2d 611 (Mo. App. 1947).
2. Mo. REV. STAT. § 325 (1939).
Provides for a widow to elect to take, in lieu of dower, one-half share absolutely
of real and personal estate belonging to the husband at the time of his death,
subject to payment of debts.
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RECENT CASES
to which she shall be rightfully entitled under and by virtue of the laws of descent
and distribution of the state of Missouri." Also, sums were given to various religious
and charitable institutions and the residuary estate was to be held in trust for his
brothers and sisters. Previous to the testator's death the widow had been adjudged
a person of unsound mind and a guardian and curator had been appointed. The
parties conceded that the trial court ruled correctly that under the will the widow
was entitled to dower interest in the real estate unless an election was made as pro-
vided by statute.3 Such election was not made by the guardian within the twelve
month period, and the court was asked to make an election. In accordance with
previous decisions,4 the court held that the widow took one-half the personalty
without election; but it held that it did not have the power to make an election
for the widow after the expiration of the twelve month period, that the statute is
mandatory, and that the election must be in accord with the terms of the statute.
There are cases in Missouri to the effect that a court of equity can make an
election for an insane widow if the guardian fails to do so or if the guardian makes
an election which the court finds is not to the best interests of the ward. 5 However,
these cases all involved a situation where the suit was filed within the twelve month
period. Where the widow was sui udis but failed to comply strictly with this section,
relief was denied by the court. The court held that the statute is mandatory as to
what shall be done in the manner of an election and that a court of equity cannot
dispense with any of the requirements of the statute, excuse failure to comply there-
with, or extend the statutory time for filing an election.6 An early Missouri case in.
passing upon this question held that the right of election by the widow of a stat-
utory share is a statutory privilege, has no existence outside the statute, and must,
therefore, be exercised in substantial compliance with it.7
3. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 318, 325, 329 (1939).
Under Section 329 this election must be in writing, acknowledged and filed in
the office of the clerk of the court in which letters testamentary or of adminis-
tration shall have been granted, within twelve months after the first publication
of notice of granting the same; and such declaration shall also be filed in the
recorder's of the same county within the same period, otherwise she shall be
endowed as provided in section 318 et seq. This section also provides for the
making of an election for a widow of unsound mind by the guardian of such widow.
4. In Re Dean's Estate, 350 Mo. 494, 166 S. W. 2d 529 (1942); In Re
Estate of Opel (Aurien), 352 Mo. 592, 179 S. W. 2d 1 (1944); Nies, Adm'x. v.
Stone, 232 Mo. App. 1226, 117 S. W. 2d 407 (1938).
5. In Re Connor's Estate, 254 Mo. 65, 162 S. W. 252 (1913); Primeau v.
Primeau, 317 Mo. 828, 297 S. W. 382 (1927). Manufacturers Bank and Trust Co. v.
Kunda, 353 Mo. 870, 185 S. W. 2d 13 (1945). In the latter case the guardian
renounced the will and took under the statute. The court found it to be to
the best interests of the widow to take under the will and thus revoked the
election.
6. Ferguson v. Long, 341 Mo. 182, 107 S. W. 2d 7 (1937) (election was
filed with the clerk of the court, but not with the recorder, within twelve months
and relief was denied); Allen v. Hartnett, 116 Mo. 278, 22 S. W. 717 (1893)
(relief denied ivhere widow made election in the required statutory form and
mailed it to the clerk but the letter miscarried-the declaration must actually
be filed in the office of the clerk).
7. Price v. Woodford, 43 Mo. 247 (1869).
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The exact case involving an insane widow who had failed to make the election
within the twelve month period has never before been decided in Missouri.8 It has
been decided that the twelve months period provided in Section 329 is to have the
effect of a statute of limitations.9 The statute includes no saving clause in case of
a widow of unsound mind. Other statutes of limitation do include such saving
clauses. Section 1002 provides for a ten year limitation on the bringing of real
actions. It is followed by Section 1004, which is in effect a saving clause in case of
minors, insane persons, or those imprisoned for less than life. The same is true
regarding the 8tatutes of limitations in case of personal actions,' 0 and the statute
regarding will contests. 1 The general rule is that a statute of limitations runs
against all persons in the absence of a specific saving clause to the contrary.'2
The result in the principal case may seem harsh. However, it will be noted
that the statute allows such an election to be made by the guardian of the insane
widow, 13 and if no such election is made or if one is made not in the best interests of
the widow, a court on application within the statutory period, can make the elec-
8. The cases from the courts of other jurisdictions are of little aid because
of a difference in the statutes. There is a confusion among these cases as to the
power of the court to set aside the statutory requirements and make the election
for the insane widow. These cases are collected in 74 A.L.R. 461 (1931), 147
A.L.R. 343 (1943). Some of the statutes do not give the guardian power to make
this election for the widow. See Wright v. West 2 Lea 78 (Tenn. 1878) (an
incompetent widow who, on account of her lunacy, neglected to dissent from
a provision made for her in her husband's will within the statutory period might
afterwards claim her rights in the estate as if she had duly dissented); Gaster v.
Gaster, 90 Neb. 529, 134 N. W. 235 (1912) (the fact that no election was made
within the prescribed time held not to prejudice the right of an insane spouse);
Cf. Re Andrews, 92 Mich. 449, 52 N. W. 743 (1892) (failure of an incompetent
widow to file the election within the year is to be deemed an election to take
under the will).
In other states there are statutes in whidh the guardian is given the
power to make the election. Re Hansen, 67 Utah 256, 247 Pac. 481 (1926) (failure
to make the election did not affect the jurisdiction of the court to direct an
election to be made). Contra Crenshaw v. Carpenter, 69 Ala. 572 (1881) (courts
have no power to create an exception taking insane persons out of the operation
of the statute); Kernan v. Carter 132 Md. 577, 104 Atl. 530 (1918) (an appli-
cation to a court of equity to make an election must be made within the time
fixed by statute).
9. Schweer v. Schweer, 86 S. W. 2d 969 (Mo. App. 1935).
10. Mo. REv. STAT. Art. 9 (1939). Section 1020 of this article provides for a
saving clause in case of minors, insane persons, and those imprisoned for less than
life.
11. Mo. REv. STAT. § 540 (1939). "If no person shall appear within the time
aforesaid (one year), then probate or rejection of such will shall be binding, saving
to infants and persons of unsound mind, a like period of one year after their respec-
tivetive disabilities are removed."
12. 34 AM. JuR., Limitation of Actions § 186 and cases there cited. "The
statute of limitations is considered as intended to embrace all causes of action
not specifically excepted from its operation, and it should not be construed'
as to defeat that object. Also, it is a general rule that where the legislature has
not seen fit to 'except a particular person or class of persons from the operation
of such statutes, the courts will not assume the right to do so."
13. Supra note 3.
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tion for the Widow.14 Thus it does not leave such widow without means of making
the election. On the other hand, an expedifious closing of estates and the rights of
creditors must be considered. One of the purposes of the limitation is to protect
creditors by enabling them to inspect the instrument if it is filed; if no such instru-
ment is filed within the required time, then they can act upon the presumption that
the widow has chosen to take under the will. Furthermore, the lack of such a re-
quirement or a holding that a court of equity can waive the requirement and make
an election for the widow in a suit filed after the period has expired would leave
the title to real estate in all such cases in a state of uncertainty. Therefore, for the
best interests of all concerned, it would seem that the principal case, under a statute
of election such as that in Missouri, reaches the most just restilt.
There is still another problem not present in the instant case whicli-is presented
by such a provision for the widow. It will be noted that the testator through the
will gave and bequeathed to his wife "all that part of my estate to which she shall
be rightfully entitled under and by virtue of the laws of descent and distribution
of the state of Missouri." The will then made provisions for various sums to be
given to religious and charitable institutions. Following these provisions was the
residuary clause giving the remainder of the 'estate to the testator's brothers
and sisters. The parties apparently agreed that this clause gave the widow
dower in the real estate, with the right to elect to take a statutory share, so that
this question was not before the court. However, as a matter of good draftsman-
ship, such a clause should not be employed. It is not entirely clear that the lan-
guage used required the result in the principal case;15 in other situations, it is very
likely that a different result would be reached.
The statute of decent and distribution 6 provides for a classification of next
of kin of the intestate, each class to take in exclusion of all others. By the terms
of this statute children of the intestate are placed in the first class; father, mother,
brothers, sisters and their descendants are of the second; and a husband or wife
is of the third. Therefore, if there are no surviving children, the members of the
second class take subject to the widow's dower, or a statutory share by election
in lieu of dower. However, if the parents and their other descendants had
predeceased the testator in the principal case, then the wife by virtue of this
statute would be entitled to the whole of the estate, both real and personal,
subject to payment of debts. It would seem that this "is the only logical result
which could be reached in construing a dause giving the widow that to which
she is entitled by virtue of the laws of descent and distribution of the state of
Missouri on such facts. Bgt it will be noted that the testator gave a portion
of his estate to certain religious and charitable institutions. Therefore, it was not
his intention to give his wife the whole of his estate. It would seem, then, in
14. Supra note 4.
15. Compare Mo.. REV. STATS., Art. 14, Descents and Distribution, § 306
(1939) with Art. 15, Dower, §§ 325, 327.
16. Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 306 (1939).
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drawing a will for one who wants to leave his wife that to which she is entitled
by virtue of the statutes, that it would be better to state expressly what the
widow is to receive in tei-ms of certain property or a certain share of the estate.
She still could renounce the will and claim dower if that were more advantageous. 17
William Icenogle
ZONING ORDINANCES- SuIT By ADJOINING PROPERTY OWNERS,
SHOWING SPECIAL DAMAGE, TO ENJOIN VIOLATION THEREOF.
Evans v. Booth'
Evans v. Roth2
The city of Columbia, Missouri adopted a zoning ordinances by which the
city is divided into seven districts for the purpose of defining construction, use
of lands and buildings thereon. One section of said ordinance, forbids in District
A the use of a building as-an apartment house, Le. a building designated for or
occupied by more than two families.4 The ordinance also defines "apartment,"
"apartment house," and "dwelling." 5
The property of both plaintiff and defendants is located in a District A and
in the immediate vicinity of each other. In 1940 the property was owned by one
who instituted proceedings before the Planning and Zoning Committee to rezone
this property to permit him to build an apartment house. Plaintiff and other
property owners filed a protest. This and -all subsequent requests for rezoning
were denied. Later permission was secured to build a duplex. The building was
visited by the city engineer who found that he had installed two kitchens and
bathrooms on each floor and that each floor had two rear entrances. At the order
of the city engineer the rear doors were closed with brick and tile and the kitchens
dismantled in each of the west units. Defendants acquired the building in 1944.
Plaintiffs brought this suit to restrain defendants from maintaining an apartment
house in violation of the city ordinance. The lower east unit is occupied by de-
fendants; the upper east unit is occupied by another family group; the lower
west unit is occupied by one lady; and the upper west unit is occupied by two
ladies. Each of the West units consists of a furnished living room, two bedrooms
17. Id. § 333.
1. 197 S. W. 2d 718 (Mo. App. 1946).
2. 201 S. W. 2d 357 (Mo. 1947).
3. Chap. 28, Revised Ordinances, City of Columbia, Mo. (1935).
4.. Sec. 1160, Revised Ordinances, City of Columbia, Mo. (1935).
5. Sec. 1156, Revised Ordinances, City of Columbia, Mo. (1935).
"Apartment: A suite of rooms or room in an apartment house, arranged,
intended, and designed for, or used as a place of residence of a single family
group of individuals living together as a single housekeeping unit."
"Apartment House: A building arranged, intended, designed for, or occu-
pied by more than two families."
"Dwelling: A building arranged, intended, designed for, or occupied by
not more than two families."
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and a bath. Each of the east units consists of five rooms and a bath, one room
fully equipped and used as a kitchen. Evidence showed that defendant orally in-
formed those living in the west units that she could not rent them apartments,
but that they must come as roomers and restrict their rights and privileges to those
ordinarily enjoyed by roomers. Injury or depreciation in value of plaintiffs'
property by the maintenance of the alleged apartment house was shown.
The trial court gave judgment for defendants; on appeal, the Kansas City
Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in the trial court, Dew, J., dissenting.
The case was certified to the supreme court. The supreme court, en banc, reversed
the judgment, all judges concurring.
The issue of law involved in this case was whether property owners showing
special damage coula bring suit in equity to enjoin violation of the zoning ordinance
without having exhausted the remedies available under the statute.6 The theory
of plaintiffs' case was that the city authorities at no time had made a ruling
that would have permitted the interested property owners to have such ruling
reviewed by a writ of certiorari. The Kansas City Court of Appeals in passing
on this question held that the zoning lqw provides a scheme by which complete
relief'may be obtained by one who is claiming in violation of a zoning ordinance.
He must first resort to the city authorities for relief and sue out a writ certiorari
should such relief be denied. It was no answer that the city authorities had not
made a ruling which the plaintiffs could have reviewed, as the law provides a
method by which plaintiffs may obtain such ruling. Furthermore, the court held
that to allow a suit such as this one would be to allow plaintiffs to elect the
tribunal in which they would proceed.
In his dissent, Dew, J., analyzed the remedy of plaintiffs under the statute,
and argued that if plaintiff were compelled to lodge with the zoning officials their
complaint against their neighbors for zoning violations, they would be subject
to the contingency that the officials might fail to act with the resulting necessity
for legal proceedings to compel them to act, and the plaintiffs would also be
subject to the further contingency that if the officials did act, the plaintiffs must
abide by the manner and methods used by the authorities in any proceedings
brought by and in behalf of the city, which might or might not afford them full
relief, and that in the latter case the only "remedy" left would be acquiescence.
He then argued that the statutory remedy is not an adequate, corhplete remedy
at law which would preclude plaintiff from applying to a court of equity to enjoin
violation of the zoning ordinances. A
In deciding this question, the supreme court held that the statute and the
ordinances did not constitute such a plain, complete, and adequate remedy as to
deprive a court of equity of jurisdiction to grant relief to adjoining property
owners; that the statute and ordinances did not purport to provide procedure
by which adjoining property owners and others interested may institute com-
6. Mo. REv. STAT. § 7412-7423 (1939).
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plaints to the building inspector, or that his inspection or any order in consequences
thereof shall or may be based on any such complaint; and that unlike zoning
ordinances in other juridictions there is no provision in this ordinance providing
for a permit or certificate of use or occupancy apart from the building permit itself.
This was a case of first impression in Missouri. Other cases concerning zoning
ordinance having been reviewed by Missouri courts, but these were cases involving
the constitutionality of the partivular ordinance as applied in a particular case.7
It has been held that in such a case involving the constitutionality of the ordinance
the courts have jurisdiction. without resort having been made to the city authorities
because the city authorities are presumed not to be qualified to pass on the question
of the constitutionality of the ordinance. The question of constitutionality was not
involved in the instant case.
Today the weight of authority is to the effect that private property owners
may bring suit for an injunction against such violations. "In most of the jurisdic-
tions in which the question has arisen, it has been held that a property owner, at
least upon showing that special damage by way of diminution in value of his prop-
erty has been or will be suffered by him as a result of the violation of the particular
zoning ordinance, may pursue his remedy by enjoining such violation; and some of
the courts hold that this may be done even in the absence of express authority in
that regard either in the ordinance or in a statute."g In deciding this question the
Supreme Court of Connecticut 9 held that the fact that the duty of enforcing zoning
ordinances rests primarily upon the zoning commission does not deprive the prop-
erty owner specifically injured by their violation of the right to maintain an action
to enjoin such violation without application to the commission for relief. However,
there is some authority to the contrary, denying equitable relief in cases where the
remedy by statute has not been exhausted and proof made of a demandon munici-
pal authorities for enforcement. 10
Also involved in this case was the question whether a living unit of several
7. Taylor v. Schlemmer, 353 Mo. 687, 132 S. W. 2d 913 (1944); Kings-
highway Presbyterian Church v. Sun Realty Co., 324 Mo. 510, 24 S. W. 2d 108(1930); Schaub v. Sun Realty'Co., 24 S. W. 2d 111 (Mo. 1930); Wippler v.
Hohn, 341 Mo. 780, 110 S. W. 2d 409 (1937).
8. Momeie'r v. John McAlister, Inc., 193 S. C. 422, 8 S. E. 2d 737, 129
A.L.R. 880, 885 (1940);Welton v. 40 East Oak Street Bldg. Corp., 70 F. 2d 377(C. C. A. 7th, 1934); Sapiro v. Frisbie, 93 Cal. App. 299, 270 Pac. 280 (1928);
Zimmerman v. OMeara, 215 Iowa 1140, 245 N. W. 715 (1932); Rice v. Van Vran-
ken, 225 App. Div. 179, 232 N. Y. Supp. 506 (3d Dep't 1929). Relief has been
denied in cases where the plaintiff failed to show that he had been damaged because
of defendant's violation of the particular zoning ordinance. Mullholland v. State
Racing Commission, 295 Mass. 286, 3 N. E. 2d 773 (1936); Lehmaier v. Wads-
,worth, 122 Conn. 571, 191 Adt. 539 (1937); Srager v. Mintz, 109 N. J. Eq. 544, 158
At]. 471 (1932).
9. 'Fitzgerald v. Merard Holding Co., Inc., 106 Conn. 475, 138 At]. 483(1927).
10. 43 C. J. S. 767 § 155; Keenly v. McCarty, 137 Misc. 524, 244 N. Y. Supp.
63 (Sup. Ct. 1930); City of Graham v. Wheeless, 89 S. W. 2d 792 (Tex. 1935);
Town of Montclair v. Kip, 110 N. J. Eq. 506, 160 Atl. 677 (1932).
[Vol. 13
38
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1948], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol13/iss1/10
1948] RECENT CASES 127
rooms not containing a kitchen was an apartment within the purview of the ordi-
nance. At the trial several real estate brokers in Columbia testified that in Columbia
it was generally considered that a unit not containing complete kitchen equipment
was not an apartment. In passing upon this question the supreme court decided
that whether a dwelling unit is an apartment does not depend on whether it con-
tains a kitchen or kitchen equipment. The court took judicial notice of the fact
that a bachelor apartment does not ordinarily include kitchen equipment, and held
that there is nothing in the ordinance, as now drawn, to exclude such units from the
ordinary definition of an apartment: The supreme court held that the units on the
east, as they were being used, were "single housekeeping units" and therefore
"apartments" as defined by the ordinance; and that the' oral agreement entered
into between defendant and those occupying the east units whereby defendants
undertook to style the nature of the occupancy as that of roomer rather than
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